1. Context: Protests by ASHA and Anganwadi Workers
The ongoing protests by ASHA and anganwadi workers in West Bengal demanding a monthly wage of ₹15,000 highlight long-standing structural issues in India’s welfare delivery architecture. These workers are central to flagship programmes such as ICDS, National Health Mission, and nutrition and maternal health interventions.
Despite their indispensable role, they continue to be classified as “volunteers” or “scheme workers” rather than formal employees. This status excludes them from labour law protections, minimum wages, and social security benefits.
The issue is not episodic but rooted in historical policy choices dating back to the inception of ICDS, reflecting a governance model that prioritised scheme expansion over workforce formalisation.
Ignoring this context risks undermining the sustainability and credibility of India’s welfare state.
The governance logic is that welfare delivery depends on labour stability; denial of formal status weakens frontline capacity.
2. Historical Institutionalisation of Informality
The denial of ‘worker’ status to anganwadi workers began under the Indira Gandhi government, when ICDS was launched with a volunteer-based framework. This laid the institutional foundation for bypassing labour laws while expanding social programmes.
As workloads expanded, anganwadi workers formed a national union in 1989, reflecting rising collective mobilisation. However, even during economic liberalisation, the state created the category of “scheme workers” instead of permanent posts.
Judicial reinforcement came through State of Karnataka vs Ameerbi (1996), where anganwadi workers were excluded from government employee status. This occurred even as the Supreme Court expanded the right to food jurisprudence in the early 2000s, increasing reliance on these workers.
This historical trajectory entrenched informality as a policy choice rather than an oversight.
The institutional logic is that informality reduced fiscal liability; persisting with it perpetuates structural exploitation.
3. Extension of the Model to ASHA Workers
The ASHA programme, introduced in the mid-2000s, followed a similar pattern by defining workers as “activists” rather than employees. This semantic framing allowed the state to expand health outreach without corresponding employment obligations.
By the 2010s, consensus emerged among government, employers, and trade unions at the 45th Indian Labour Conference recommending regularisation, minimum wages, and pension and gratuity benefits for ASHA workers.
However, both UPA and NDA governments chose not to implement these recommendations, reinforcing policy continuity across regimes.
Failure to act despite consensus reflects deliberate policy inertia rather than administrative incapacity.
The policy logic is that non-implementation preserved fiscal flexibility; ignoring consensus erodes institutional trust.
4. Fiscal Retrenchment and Centre–State Disparities
In 2015, the NDA government reduced ICDS budget allocations, intensifying financial stress on anganwadi workers. Further, the Centre froze its contribution to honoraria in 2018, transferring fiscal pressure to States.
States, with greater responsibility for hiring and dispute resolution, were compelled to top up payments from their own budgets. This led to wide inter-State disparities, with wealthier or electorally pressured States offering higher pay or additional benefits.
Fiscally constrained States, however, struggled to match these levels, resulting in unequal compensation for similar work across India.
Such disparities undermine the principle of equity in national welfare schemes.
Fiscal dynamics:
- Centre’s contribution frozen: 2018
- ICDS budget cut: 2015
- Result: Uneven State-level top-ups
The federal logic is that decentralisation without fiscal support deepens inequality; ignoring this weakens cooperative federalism.
5. Labour Codes and the Exit from the Social Contract
The denial of formal status to ASHA and anganwadi workers coincides with the lack of guaranteed protections for gig and platform workers under the new labour codes. This signals a broader retreat of the state from its social contract with vulnerable workers.
By prioritising business metrics and fiscal headroom, the state has normalised informality even in publicly funded welfare delivery.
This approach risks hollowing out labour rights while increasing dependence on precarious work arrangements.
Failure to address this trend may erode the legitimacy of labour reforms and welfare governance.
“Economic growth without social justice is fragile and unsustainable.” — International Labour Organization (ILO)
The development logic is that welfare outcomes depend on labour dignity; erosion of rights weakens human development gains.
6. Way Forward: Legal Reclassification and Fiscal Coordination
The article argues for the legal reclassification of ASHA and anganwadi workers as statutory employees under the Code on Social Security. This would guarantee minimum wages, pension, and social security coverage.
Equally important is coordinated fiscal action by the Centre and States to bridge funding gaps and ensure equitable pay across regions.
Institutionalising these protections would align welfare delivery with constitutional values of dignity and equality.
Without reform, protests and service disruptions are likely to persist, affecting beneficiaries most.
Policy measures suggested:
- Statutory employee status under Code on Social Security
- Guaranteed minimum wages and pensions
- Centre–State fiscal burden sharing
The reform logic is that formalisation strengthens welfare delivery; delay entrenches exploitation and instability.
Conclusion
The condition of ASHA and anganwadi workers reflects a deeper governance challenge in balancing fiscal prudence with labour dignity. Recognising these workers as statutory employees and ensuring equitable compensation is essential for sustaining India’s welfare state and upholding the social contract underlying inclusive development.
