1. Background: The Sabarimala Verdict (2018) and Its Constitutional Significance
In Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018), a five-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, by a 4:1 majority, struck down the exclusion of women aged 10–50 years from entering the Sabarimala temple in Kerala. The judgment declared that the restriction violated women’s fundamental rights under the Constitution.
The majority held that devotees of Lord Ayyappa did not constitute a separate religious denomination. It further ruled that Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, which formed the legal basis of the ban, violated both:
- The Constitution, and
- Section 3 of the parent Act, which guarantees temple entry to all classes of Hindus.
The ruling generated intense public debate. While many saw it as a transformative constitutional moment expanding gender justice, others viewed it as judicial overreach into matters of faith. Nearly a decade later, a nine-judge Bench is set to examine larger constitutional questions in review proceedings, indicating the case’s enduring institutional significance.
This case represents a core constitutional tension between equality and religious autonomy. If unresolved coherently, such conflicts risk undermining both social harmony and the credibility of constitutional adjudication.
2. Majority and Dissent: Competing Constitutional Visions
The judgment comprised:
- Majority opinion by then CJI Dipak Misra (joined by Justice A.M. Khanwilkar)
- Separate concurring opinions by Justices R.F. Nariman and D.Y. Chandrachud
- A dissent by Justice Indu Malhotra
The majority held that the exclusion of women:
- Violated Article 25 (freedom of religion of individuals)
- Failed the test of denominational protection under Article 26
- Was unconstitutional as it denied equal access to a public religious institution
Justice Malhotra’s dissent emphasised that fundamental rights must be harmonised in a secular polity. She argued that a generic notion of equality should not override the collective rights of a religious group to practise its faith according to established customs. She considered the exclusion an “essential religious practice” and thus constitutionally protected.
The divergence reflects two interpretive approaches:
- Transformative constitutionalism (prioritising dignity and equality)
- Deferential pluralism (prioritising religious autonomy)
The disagreement illustrates the judiciary’s challenge in balancing individual rights with communitarian claims. If courts privilege one dimension without principled limits, it may distort either equality jurisprudence or religious freedom protections.
3. The Essential Religious Practices (ERP) Test: Origins and Critique
To adjudicate disputes between religious freedom and state intervention, the Supreme Court has historically applied the Essential Religious Practices (ERP) test. Under this doctrine, courts determine whether a disputed practice is essential to a religion; only essential practices receive constitutional protection.
A notable precedent is Sastri Yagnapurushadji v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya (1966), where the Court relied on scriptural interpretation to decide what was central to the Swaminarayan sect. This approach effectively required judges to interpret religious doctrine.
Criticisms of the ERP test include:
- Courts assume a theological role inconsistent with secularism.
- Judges determine what qualifies as “essential,” thereby shaping religion itself.
- The test lacks procedural robustness, as courts often decide complex theological questions without detailed evidentiary processes.
- It provides limited guidance when an “essential” practice conflicts with dignity or equality.
As Justice Chandrachud observed:
"By entering upon doctrinal issues of what does or does not constitute an essential part of religion, the Court has, as a necessary consequence, been required to adopt a religious mantle." — Justice D.Y. Chandrachud (Sabarimala case)
The ERP test risks transforming constitutional courts into arbiters of faith. If courts continue theological adjudication, it may erode both judicial legitimacy and the principle of secular neutrality.
4. The Anti-Exclusion Test: A Constitutional Alternative
Justice Chandrachud proposed an alternative framework — the “anti-exclusion test.” Unlike ERP, this test does not assess whether a practice is essential to religion. Instead, it examines whether a practice:
- Excludes individuals in a way that impairs dignity, or
- Denies access to basic goods or civic spaces.
Under this formulation:
- Religious groups retain autonomy to define their doctrines.
- However, such autonomy cannot justify systematic exclusion that violates constitutional guarantees of equality and dignity.
The focus shifts from theological essentiality to constitutional compatibility. The inquiry remains grounded in constitutional values rather than scriptural interpretation.
This approach aligns with the idea that:
- Article 25 (individual religious freedom) is subject to other fundamental rights.
- The Constitution protects belief but not discriminatory consequences of belief.
The anti-exclusion test reframes the issue: the question is not whether a practice is religiously central, but whether its effects undermine equal moral membership in the constitutional order. Ignoring this shift could perpetuate structural exclusion under the guise of faith.
5. Broader Constitutional Implications
The nine-judge Bench’s deliberations will affect not only Sabarimala but also other disputes involving religious autonomy and individual dignity, including:
- Dawoodi Bohra excommunication cases
- Rights of Parsi women marrying outside the community
These disputes highlight that religion in India is deeply intertwined with social identity, civic participation, and access to institutions. Courts cannot remain indifferent to the real-world consequences of religious practices.
Key Constitutional Provisions:
- Article 25: Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice, and propagation of religion (subject to public order, morality, health, and other fundamental rights)
- Article 26: Rights of religious denominations to manage religious affairs
- Articles 14 & 15: Equality before law and prohibition of discrimination
The central constitutional question is: Can communitarian autonomy override individual dignity and equal access?
The anti-exclusion framework suggests that while faith is autonomous internally, its outward manifestation must comply with constitutional guarantees of equal protection.
If the individual remains the basic unit of constitutional concern, religious autonomy cannot legitimise exclusion from civic or public institutions. Failure to resolve this coherently may produce fragmented jurisprudence across similar disputes.
6. Governance and Institutional Significance
The Sabarimala review has implications for:
- Judicial restraint vs. activism
- Secularism as neutrality vs. reformist intervention
- Transformative constitutionalism
- Gender justice in religious spaces
- Federal-state dynamics (as temple regulation is often state-governed)
It also raises deeper institutional concerns:
- Should courts define theology?
- How should constitutional morality interact with social morality?
- What are the limits of judicial review in culturally sensitive matters?
A principled doctrinal shift would provide:
- Predictability in adjudication
- Reduced perception of judicial overreach
- Stronger integration of equality jurisprudence with religious freedom
Conclusion
The Sabarimala dispute is not merely about temple entry; it is about the architecture of India’s religious freedom regime. The move from the Essential Religious Practices test to an Anti-Exclusion framework signals a transition from theological adjudication to constitutional scrutiny of consequences.
How the Supreme Court resolves this tension will shape the future balance between faith, dignity, and equality. A coherent doctrine that protects belief while preventing discrimination is essential to preserving both religious pluralism and the Constitution’s transformative promise.