‘One Nation, One Election’ (ONOE) refers to the proposal to synchronise elections to the Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assemblies so that they are conducted simultaneously across India. The objective is to create a unified electoral cycle where national and State elections take place together every five years. Proponents argue that such synchronisation would reduce election-related expenditure, minimise disruptions caused by the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), and allow governments to focus more on governance rather than continuous campaigning.

The most comprehensive framework for implementing ONOE was proposed by the High-Level Committee chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind (2023–24). Its recommendations have been translated into legislative form through the Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill, 2024. The Bill introduces a proposed Article 82A, which empowers the President to notify an “appointed date” from which the electoral cycles of State Assemblies would be aligned with the Lok Sabha. This alignment could involve curtailing the tenure of some State Assemblies so that they match the national election cycle.

The Bill also introduces the concept of ‘unexpired-term elections’, where if a legislature is dissolved before completing its term, the newly elected House would serve only the remainder of the original term rather than receiving a fresh five-year mandate. Additionally, amendments are proposed to Articles 83, 172, and 327 to enable synchronised elections and provide powers to the Election Commission of India (ECI) to recommend deferring State elections if simultaneous polls are not feasible.

Thus, ONOE represents not merely an administrative reform but a major constitutional restructuring that seeks to alter India’s electoral calendar and the relationship between the Union and the States.

Critics argue that the One Nation, One Election (ONOE) proposal could weaken the fundamental principles of India’s parliamentary system, particularly the concept of continuous executive accountability to the legislature. In India’s constitutional design, governments remain in power only as long as they retain the confidence of the legislature. This principle is reflected in Articles 75 and 164, which establish the collective responsibility of the executive to Parliament and State legislatures respectively.

The Constitution deliberately provides only a maximum tenure of five years for legislatures under Articles 83 and 172, rather than guaranteeing a fixed term. Early dissolution is therefore considered a legitimate democratic mechanism that allows voters to renew or withdraw their mandate if political instability or loss of confidence occurs. The ONOE proposal, by contrast, treats early dissolution as an administrative inconvenience and attempts to preserve synchronised election cycles through mechanisms such as unexpired-term elections.

This approach could subtly shift India toward a quasi-presidential model where fixed electoral cycles take precedence over legislative accountability. If a government loses majority support mid-term, the resulting election may produce a legislature with only a short residual tenure, reducing incentives for effective governance and structural reform. Such truncated mandates could weaken the democratic link between voters and elected representatives.

Therefore, critics argue that while ONOE aims to increase administrative efficiency, it risks undermining a core feature of India’s constitutional design — the principle that governments must remain continuously accountable to the people through their elected legislatures.

One of the central criticisms of the ONOE proposal is that it may undermine the principle of federalism, which has been recognised by the Supreme Court as part of the Constitution’s basic structure. In the landmark case of S.R. Bommai vs Union of India (1994), the Court emphasised that States are not merely administrative units of the Union but possess an independent constitutional identity. Their political processes, including election cycles, may legitimately differ from those of the national government.

Synchronising elections would require aligning State Assembly tenures with the Lok Sabha cycle. This could lead to situations where a State government’s mandate is prematurely curtailed simply to maintain synchronisation. For example, if a State Assembly election occurs in 2033 but the national cycle requires elections in 2034, the State government could effectively receive only a one-year mandate. Such truncation raises concerns about democratic legitimacy and respect for State autonomy.

Additionally, the proposal allows the Election Commission to recommend deferring State elections if simultaneous conduct is impractical. Critics argue that such provisions may create opportunities for prolonged President’s Rule, enabling the Union government to govern States indirectly through Governors. This could disturb the balance of power between the Union and States.

Therefore, the federal concern is not merely about election scheduling but about preserving the constitutional principle that States have their own democratic rhythms and mandates, independent of the Union’s political calendar.

International experiences provide important insights into the potential advantages and risks of conducting simultaneous elections. A notable example is Indonesia, which attempted a massive one-day election in 2019 combining presidential, parliamentary, and regional elections. The aim was to reduce administrative costs and simplify the electoral process. However, the experiment had severe unintended consequences: nearly 900 poll workers died and over 5,000 fell seriously ill due to extreme workload and logistical pressures.

The situation repeated itself during Indonesia’s 2024 elections, which again witnessed significant health risks for election officials. As a result, the Indonesian Constitutional Court in 2025 ruled that national and local elections must be held separately from 2029 onwards, citing concerns about administrative overload and democratic participation. This example highlights how large-scale simultaneous elections can strain institutional capacity.

Other democracies also provide contrasting models. In Canada, federal and provincial elections occur independently, reflecting the country’s federal structure. In Germany, State (Länder) elections are deliberately staggered, ensuring continuous democratic feedback. Even in the United States, fixed electoral cycles operate within a presidential system where the executive’s tenure is independent of legislative confidence.

These examples demonstrate that most mature democracies maintain staggered electoral cycles to preserve federal balance, ensure administrative feasibility, and maintain regular democratic accountability. For India, these lessons suggest that electoral synchronisation may not necessarily strengthen democracy and could instead create new institutional challenges.

One of the most frequently cited arguments in favour of the One Nation, One Election proposal is that it would reduce the financial and administrative burden associated with conducting frequent elections. Proponents claim that simultaneous polls would save public resources, minimise security deployments, and reduce disruptions caused by the Model Code of Conduct.

However, critics argue that the fiscal savings are often overstated. According to estimates by the Parliamentary Standing Committee, the combined cost of Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections in 2015–16 was approximately ₹4,500 crore. This represented only about 0.25% of the Union Budget and roughly 0.03% of India’s GDP. Historical data from PRS Legislative Research shows that Lok Sabha election costs between 1957 and 2014 ranged from only 0.02% to 0.05% of GDP, indicating that elections constitute a very small portion of public expenditure.

Furthermore, India’s current system of staggered elections allows the Election Commission to efficiently rotate resources such as EVMs, VVPAT machines, and security personnel across different States. Conducting simultaneous elections nationwide would require deploying these resources everywhere at once, potentially increasing logistical costs rather than reducing them.

From a democratic perspective, elections are not merely administrative events but essential instruments of accountability. Frequent elections provide opportunities for citizens to evaluate governments and express political preferences. Therefore, critics argue that the relatively small financial savings offered by ONOE may not justify a constitutional restructuring that could weaken federalism and democratic responsiveness.

The concept of ‘unexpired-term elections’ is one of the most controversial elements of the ONOE proposal. Under this mechanism, if a legislature is dissolved before completing its five-year term, the newly elected House would serve only the remainder of the original term instead of receiving a fresh five-year mandate. The objective of this provision is to preserve the synchronised election cycle across the country.

However, this approach raises several governance and democratic concerns. First, it may devalue the electoral mandate. If voters elect a new government but that government serves only a short residual tenure, the election effectively becomes a temporary arrangement rather than a meaningful democratic exercise. This could discourage voter participation and increase public cynicism toward the political process.

Second, residual-term governments may lack incentives to pursue long-term policy reforms. With limited time in office, such governments may prioritise short-term populist measures rather than structural reforms in areas such as infrastructure, economic policy, or social welfare. This could create a prolonged period of weak governance or policy drift.

Finally, the mechanism could create constitutional complications at both the Union and State levels. For example, if elections are delayed to maintain synchronisation, caretaker governments may continue in office for extended periods, raising questions about fiscal governance, parliamentary functioning, and constitutional accountability. Thus, the ‘unexpired-term election’ model illustrates the complex institutional challenges that ONOE may introduce into India’s democratic system.