The Undermining of Governors' Constitutional Role in India

Examining the actions of Governors in non-BJP states and their implications on constitutional conventions.

Gopi

•January 22, 2026•5 mins read

Governor’s Address and Constitutional Convention Under Strain

Not Started

1. Constitutional Convention of Governor’s Address

The Governor’s address at the commencement of the first session of the State Legislative Assembly each year is a long-established constitutional convention in India. It is intended to communicate the policies and priorities of the elected State government to the legislature, not the personal views of the Governor.

This convention flows from India’s adoption of the Westminster model, where the Head of State acts on ministerial advice. The address is therefore symbolic of democratic continuity, executive accountability, and respect for the popular mandate.

Departures from this convention undermine the clarity of responsibility in governance. If the Governor deviates from or refuses to read the prepared text, it creates ambiguity about who speaks for the State and weakens the principle of cabinet responsibility.

Ignoring this convention risks converting a procedural constitutional ritual into a site of political contestation, thereby eroding institutional trust between constitutional authorities.

This convention sustains the logic of parliamentary democracy by separating ceremonial authority from executive power; if disregarded, it blurs accountability and destabilises routine legislative functioning.

"Mouthpieces of the State governments." — R. Venkataraman

2. Recent Deviations and Institutional Friction

In January 2026, the Governors of Tamil Nadu and Kerala departed from established practice during their Assembly addresses. In Tamil Nadu, the Governor declined to read the prepared speech, citing objections to its content, while in Kerala, the Chief Minister publicly corrected deviations made by the Governor.

Such actions are not isolated incidents but part of a broader pattern observed in non-BJP-ruled States. Repeated deviations by Governors who are constitutionally expected to act on aid and advice amplify Centre–State frictions.

These episodes shift focus from policy substance to procedural disputes, disrupting legislative business and public discourse. Over time, they normalise confrontation rather than cooperation within constitutional frameworks.

If left unaddressed, this pattern risks institutionalising conflict and weakening the credibility of the Governor’s office as a neutral constitutional authority.

When constitutional offices become sites of recurring dispute, governance attention shifts from development outcomes to procedural legitimacy, reducing administrative effectiveness.

3. Constitutional Provisions Governing Addresses

Articles 87 and 176 of the Constitution mandate special addresses by the President and Governors at the beginning of the first session of Parliament and State legislatures each year. These provisions are directly borrowed from British parliamentary practice.

At the same time, Articles 86 and 175 independently empower the President and Governors to address the legislature at any time. This indicates that the mandatory annual address is not the sole channel of communication.

Former President R. Venkataraman had described these mandatory addresses as a colonial legacy lacking substantive value in a mature democracy.

Retaining provisions that no longer serve a functional purpose can burden constitutional practice with avoidable friction.

The coexistence of mandatory and discretionary address provisions suggests functional redundancy; failure to rationalise them perpetuates symbolic practices that no longer add governance value.

"A British anachronism" — R. Venkataraman
"A meaningless formality" — R. Venkataraman

4. Federalism and the Role of the Governor

The Governor is envisaged as a constitutional link between the Union and the State, not as an alternative political authority within the State. Respecting conventions is central to maintaining cooperative federalism.

When Governors assume discretionary roles not envisaged by the Constitution, it alters the balance of federal relations. This can be perceived as indirect central interference in State governance.

Such conduct weakens the neutrality of constitutional offices and may provoke States to seek structural changes, thereby escalating institutional distrust.

Over time, this can dilute the stabilising role the Governor is meant to play in times of constitutional uncertainty.

Federal stability depends on restrained use of constitutional authority; if conventions are ignored, formal powers risk being interpreted expansively, unsettling Centre–State equilibrium.

5. Proposal to Amend Articles 87 and 176

Tamil Nadu’s Chief Minister has proposed amending the Constitution to remove the requirement of the Governor’s address at the start of the Assembly year. This echoes earlier recommendations by President Venkataraman made nearly 35 years ago.

The proposal aligns with the broader political narrative of repealing outdated colonial-era provisions. Removing these Articles would not silence constitutional heads, as discretionary address powers would remain intact.

Eliminating the mandatory address could reduce avoidable confrontations without affecting legislative functioning or executive accountability.

However, such reform requires careful consideration to preserve constitutional symbolism while enhancing functional efficiency.

Selective constitutional pruning can modernise governance structures; ignoring this opportunity may perpetuate rituals that generate friction without substantive democratic gain.

6. Way Forward and Institutional Balance

Governors must adhere strictly to the letter and spirit of the Constitution, especially conventions that reinforce democratic accountability. Institutional self-restraint is essential for preserving legitimacy.

Constitutional reform, if undertaken, should aim at reducing redundancy and conflict while safeguarding core federal principles. Clear conventions and consistent practice are preferable to ad hoc confrontations.

Strengthening mutual respect between elected governments and constitutional heads will enhance policy focus and legislative productivity.

Ultimately, stable constitutional behaviour contributes to long-term governance credibility and cooperative federal development.

Respect for constitutional roles ensures predictability and trust; sustained disregard invites structural disruption and weakens democratic institutions.

Conclusion

The controversy surrounding Governors’ addresses highlights the tension between inherited constitutional forms and contemporary democratic practice. Rationalising outdated provisions while reinforcing constitutional conventions can strengthen federal governance, reduce institutional conflict, and improve the quality of legislative functioning in the long run.

Quick Q&A

Everything you need to know

Constitutional Role: Under Articles 176 and 175 of the Indian Constitution, Governors are required to make a special address to the State Legislature, typically at the commencement of the first Assembly session of the year. This address informs the Legislature of the policies and priorities of the elected State government.

Function: The Governor functions primarily as a constitutional link between the State and the Union government. The speech is generally prepared by the State Cabinet, reflecting government policy, and the Governor is expected to read it verbatim. Deviating from the text or altering it independently can be seen as a breach of constitutional conventions.

Comparative Perspective: This practice is derived from the Westminster model, where the British monarch delivers the speech prepared by the government, emphasizing the ceremonial and informative nature of the address rather than policy-making. The Indian system mirrors this convention to ensure the Governor acts as a neutral conduit for government policy.

Deviation from Convention: Governors R.N. Ravi and Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar have recently drawn attention for not strictly adhering to the prepared legislative addresses. Mr. Ravi refused to read the speech citing 'misleading statements', while Mr. Arlekar made alterations in Kerala, deviating from Cabinet-approved text.

Implications: Such actions raise concerns about the neutrality and constitutional propriety of Governors. As constitutional functionaries, they are expected to act as 'mouthpieces' of the elected government, and unilateral modifications can undermine the principle of parliamentary democracy and the separation of ceremonial and executive powers.

Debate on Reform: The repeated violations have led to suggestions, including by Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.K. Stalin, for a constitutional amendment to abolish the mandatory Governor’s address. Critics argue that while Articles 175 and 176 can technically be amended, the Governor retains the right to address the Assembly under Articles 175 and 86, preserving the essence of communication between State executives and the Legislature.

Origin: The Indian system inherited this convention from the British Westminster model, where the monarch delivers a ceremonial speech prepared by the Cabinet. The speech outlines government policies, not the personal views of the monarch.

Function in India: Governors, similar to the monarch, are expected to read the prepared text to maintain the neutrality of the office and ensure that the elected government’s policies are accurately communicated to the Legislature. This preserves the principle that policy-making rests with elected representatives rather than unelected officials.

Significance: Adhering to this practice ensures political stability, respects federal principles, and upholds constitutional decorum. Deviations, as seen in Tamil Nadu and Kerala, can create tensions between State governments and Governors, leading to calls for clearer guidelines or even amendments to formalize or abolish outdated conventions.

Historical Critique: Former President R. Venkataraman described the practice as a 'British anachronism' and a 'meaningless formality', noting that the speech often reiterates decisions already made by the elected government rather than initiating policy.

Practical Concerns: The convention has been repeatedly violated or used controversially, as in Tamil Nadu, where Governors have refused or modified speeches. Such incidents highlight the lack of enforceability and clarity in the current system, creating ambiguity about the Governor's powers.

Legal and Constitutional Perspective: Amending Articles 175 and 176 could streamline legislative procedures while retaining the Governor's right to communicate with the Assembly under Articles 175 and 86. The amendment would remove an outdated ceremonial requirement without affecting the core constitutional framework or the federal balance of power.

Impact on Federalism: The Indian Constitution envisions a federal structure with a clear demarcation between the Union and State governments. Governors are constitutional appointees who should act as neutral arbiters. Altering or refusing to read the speech, as seen in Tamil Nadu, challenges this neutrality and can be perceived as interference in the State’s executive domain.

Political Consequences: Such actions can strain Centre-State relations, provoke public controversy, and politicize the office of the Governor. This risks undermining public trust in the impartiality of constitutional institutions.

Need for Reform: Critics argue that codifying the ceremonial nature of the speech or removing the mandatory address could strengthen federal principles by clearly limiting the Governor’s powers, ensuring that elected representatives retain primary responsibility for policy communication while preserving constitutional integrity.

Historical Recommendations: About 35 years ago, President R. Venkataraman repeatedly recommended to Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Chandra Shekhar that the Governor’s address be deleted through a constitutional amendment. He described it as a relic of colonial administration and unnecessary for modern governance.

Recent Developments: Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.K. Stalin has echoed these concerns, calling for amending the Constitution to remove the practice after repeated controversies involving Governor R.N. Ravi.

Rationale: The common thread in these recommendations is the recognition that while Governors retain the right to address legislatures under Articles 175 and 86, the formal, ceremonial first session speech is often redundant, susceptible to controversy, and not essential for governance, making reform both practical and constitutionally safe.

Case Study: On January 20, 2026, Tamil Nadu Governor R.N. Ravi declined to read the prepared Assembly speech, citing unsubstantiated claims and misleading statements. In Kerala, Governor Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar modified portions of the speech that had been cleared by the Cabinet. Both incidents deviate from the long-standing convention that Governors read the text verbatim.

Implications: These actions illustrate the tension between constitutional conventions and personal discretion of constitutional functionaries. While not technically illegal, such deviations highlight ambiguities in the system and can trigger political controversy, eroding trust in impartiality.

Lessons: The incidents underscore the need to clarify the role of Governors, either through formal amendments or codified guidelines, to prevent misuse of ceremonial conventions and ensure that federal principles and parliamentary norms are upheld.