Should the Governor’s Address Be Scrapped in India?

Q: What is the constitutional significance of the Governor’s address to the State Legislature under Article 176 ?

Constitutional purpose: Article 176 of the Indian Constitution mandates that the Governor shall address the State Legislature at the commencement of the first session each year and the first session after a general election. This address is not a personal speech of the Governor but a formal statement of the elected government’s legislative agenda. It outlines proposed policies, programmes, and priorities for the coming year, thereby providing a roadmap for legislative business and public accountability.Nature of the address: The content of the address is prepared and approved by the Council of Ministers. The Governor’s role is purely constitutional and ceremonial in this context, similar to the President’s address under Article 87 at the Union level. As clarified by constitutional experts and judicial precedents, the Governor bears no responsibility for the contents and cannot claim ownership or dissent over the policies articulated in it.Institutional significance: The address symbolises the Governor’s position as an integral part of the State Legislature under Article 168. It reflects the Westminster model adopted by India, where the nominal head formally communicates the elected executive’s agenda to the legislature. When Governors refuse to deliver the Cabinet-approved address or selectively read it, the constitutional balance between the elected executive and the nominal head is disturbed, raising concerns about legislative obstruction and erosion of constitutional conventions.

Q: Why is a Governor’s refusal to read the Cabinet-approved address considered a violation of constitutional morality?

Violation of constitutional mandate: A Governor’s refusal to deliver the Cabinet-approved address runs contrary to the explicit mandate of Article 176. Constitutional morality requires all constitutional functionaries to act within the spirit and letter of the Constitution, even where discretion appears politically tempting. By walking out or selectively reading the address, the Governor undermines the authority of the elected government and disrupts the formal commencement of legislative proceedings.Judicial clarification: In Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016), the Supreme Court clearly held that the Governor’s address is an executive function performed strictly on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The judgment emphasised that discretionary powers of the Governor are limited and cannot be expanded through personal interpretation or political considerations. Any deviation, therefore, lacks constitutional sanction.Broader implications: Such actions are particularly problematic in Opposition-ruled States, as seen recently in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala. They reinforce perceptions of partisan conduct and Centre-State imbalance. Over time, repeated disregard for constitutional conventions can normalise executive obstruction by nominal heads, weakening democratic accountability and potentially precipitating constitutional crises where legislative functioning itself is stalled.

Q: How does the institutional design of the Governor’s office contribute to recurring constitutional tensions with elected State governments?

Mode of appointment and tenure: Governors are appointed by the President and hold office during the President’s pleasure, which in practice translates to the confidence of the Union Council of Ministers. Unlike the President, who is indirectly elected and subject to impeachment by Parliament, Governors lack direct or indirect accountability to the State Legislature in which they function. This structural feature creates an inherent asymmetry in Centre-State relations.Impact on neutrality: Because continuance in office depends on the Union government, Governors may be perceived — rightly or wrongly — as political agents rather than neutral constitutional referees. This perception is amplified in Opposition-ruled States, where Governors’ actions, such as withholding assent to Bills or refusing to deliver addresses, are interpreted as instruments of political pressure rather than constitutional caution.Comparative insight: The relative absence of controversy around the President’s conduct highlights this institutional contrast. The President’s accountability to Parliament and the possibility of impeachment act as strong normative checks. In contrast, the Governor’s office lacks equivalent safeguards, making constitutional discipline more dependent on personal integrity and conventions than enforceable accountability. This design flaw explains the persistence of friction despite clear constitutional text and judicial guidance.

Q: Critically examine whether the practice of the Governor’s address should be retained or abolished.

Arguments for retention: Supporters argue that the Governor’s address, though largely symbolic, affirms the Governor’s role as part of the legislature and reflects continuity with the Westminster parliamentary tradition. It provides a formal mechanism for the government to place its agenda on record and allows legislators to debate and move a motion of thanks, thereby enabling democratic scrutiny of executive priorities.Arguments for reconsideration: Critics contend that the practice has lost functional relevance and has become a flashpoint for partisan confrontation. As noted by constitutional experts, at least two other legislative sessions each year commence without a Governor’s address, demonstrating that legislative functioning does not inherently depend on this ritual. Moreover, Article 175 already empowers Governors to address or send messages to the House when required, offering an alternative constitutional mechanism.Balanced assessment: Rather than outright abolition, the real issue lies in preventing misuse of the office. Retaining the practice while reinforcing constitutional conventions, clearer judicial enforcement, and political accountability may be preferable. Abolishing the address risks treating a symptom while leaving the underlying institutional design and accountability deficits unaddressed.

Q: What constitutional remedies are available when a Governor’s conduct threatens to create a constitutional crisis in a State?

Presidential intervention: The Constitution provides mechanisms to address gubernatorial misconduct. Under Article 160, the President is empowered to make provisions for the discharge of the Governor’s functions in contingencies not explicitly covered. Constitutional experts argue that when a Governor refuses to perform mandatory duties under Article 176, the President should intervene and direct compliance or require the Governor to demit office.Role of Article 355: Article 355 imposes a duty on the Union to ensure that governance in States is carried on in accordance with the Constitution. If a Governor’s actions obstruct legislative functioning, it raises questions about whether this duty is being meaningfully fulfilled. Failure to act may indirectly legitimise partisan conduct and embolden further deviations from constitutional norms.Case-based relevance: Recent incidents in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala illustrate how inaction can escalate tensions between Raj Bhavans and elected governments. While judicial review remains an option, timely political and constitutional intervention by the President is crucial to prevent erosion of federal trust. Ultimately, these episodes strengthen the case for deeper reforms in the appointment, accountability, and removal processes of Governors to safeguard constitutional governance.

A critical analysis of the constitutional role of Governors and the recent controversies surrounding their addresses in state assemblies.

Surya

•February 6, 2026•5 mins read

Debate intensifies over Governors’ constitutional role after walkouts and altered Assembly addresses in several Opposition-ruled States

Not Started

1. Constitutional Mandate for Governors’ Address

Under Article 176 of the Indian Constitution, Governors are required to address the State legislature at the commencement of the first session each year and at the first session following a general election. The address sets out the government’s legislative agenda, policies, and programmes for the upcoming session. The text of the speech is prepared by the State Cabinet, and the Governor, as a constitutional functionary, is obligated to deliver it as drafted.

Recent instances, such as Governor Thaawarchand Gehlot walking out of Karnataka’s legislative session, Governor R.N. Ravi skipping Tamil Nadu’s inaugural address, and Governor Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar omitting parts of the speech in Kerala, represent departures from this constitutional requirement.

Governors failing to deliver the Cabinet-approved address undermine the legislative process and violate the explicit constitutional mandate, raising concerns about adherence to constitutional norms.

2. Limits on Gubernatorial Discretion

Governors cannot exercise discretion to alter the address. The Supreme Court in Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) clarified that a Governor’s address is an executive function performed strictly on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Unlike the President, who is indirectly elected and accountable to Parliament, Governors hold office at the pleasure of the President, making them susceptible to Union government influence rather than the State legislature.

“The Governor cannot alter the address prepared by the State Cabinet and is required only to read it before the House. The Governor bears no responsibility for its contents.” — P.D.T. Achary

Ignoring this principle risks politicising a constitutional office and potentially creating parallel power structures within States.

3. Recourse for Governors with Reservations

Governors may have personal reservations about the policies or contents of the address, but these must be communicated privately to the Council of Ministers. They cannot withhold or selectively read the speech based on personal views. The constitutional framework prioritises the executive authority of elected ministers over gubernatorial discretion.

Mechanism:

Private counsel with the Chief Minister/Council of Ministers
Acceptance of the Cabinet’s decision once in office
Limitation to advisory, non-executive functions

Respecting this discipline ensures that the Governor remains a neutral constitutional figure, preventing conflicts between the State and the Union.

4. Historical and Symbolic Significance

The practice of delivering the Governor’s address originates from the Westminster parliamentary model and symbolises the Governor’s role as an integral part of the legislature (Article 168). While largely ceremonial, it maintains continuity and formal recognition of the Governor’s place in the legislative process.

“The focus should be on addressing instances of constitutionally impermissible gubernatorial discretion rather than abandoning the convention altogether.” — Alok Prasanna Kumar

Eliminating the practice without addressing underlying issues would remove an important procedural mechanism for formal legislative commencement.

5. Issues with Partisan Conduct

Instances in Opposition-ruled States indicate visible partisan conduct by Governors, including refusal to read the address. This raises constitutional concerns under:

Article 355: Union government’s duty to ensure governance according to the Constitution
Article 176: Mandate for annual and post-election addresses

Failure to deliver the address can precipitate a constitutional crisis, as legislative sessions cannot formally commence without it.

Examples:

Tamil Nadu: Governor R.N. Ravi did not deliver the inaugural address
Karnataka: Governor Gehlot walked out after reading few lines
Kerala: Partial reading by Governor Arlekar

Partisan deviations threaten constitutional governance and the smooth functioning of legislatures.

6. Presidential Intervention and Constitutional Remedies

The President, under Article 160, can direct a Governor to perform duties or resign if they act in a partisan manner. Historically, this power has rarely been invoked, even when gubernatorial conduct risks a constitutional crisis.

Possible actions:

Direction to deliver the Cabinet-approved address
Removal or request to demit office in case of non-compliance

Active presidential oversight is essential to uphold constitutional discipline and prevent misuse of gubernatorial powers.

7. Feasibility of Reform

Calls for abolishing the Governor’s address, such as by Tamil Nadu CM M.K. Stalin, face practical and political hurdles:

Requires a Constitutional Amendment with special majority (majority of total membership + two-thirds of members present and voting)
Union government support is unlikely
Amendment may provide limited practical benefit compared to reforms in appointment and removal of Governors

“A more meaningful reform would be to reconsider the manner in which Governors are appointed and removed… ensuring Governors remain mindful that their allegiance lies with the Constitution, not the Union government.” — Alok Prasanna Kumar

Institutional reforms targeting appointment and accountability are likely more effective than removing ceremonial addresses.

8. Way Forward

To strengthen constitutional governance:

Governors must adhere strictly to Article 176 and deliver Cabinet-approved addresses
Union government and President should actively ensure compliance (Article 160, Article 355)
Political and administrative consensus on reforms in Governor appointments and accountability is necessary
Maintain the ceremonial address to preserve legislative formalism, while addressing deviations through legal and institutional mechanisms

Upholding these conventions reinforces democratic processes, preserves legislative authority, and prevents constitutional crises in States.

9. Conclusion

The Governor’s address is a constitutional and symbolic mechanism, reinforcing the Governor’s role within the State legislature. Partisan deviations and discretionary refusals undermine legislative authority and threaten constitutional governance. Rather than abolishing the practice, focus should be on ensuring compliance, strengthening accountability of Governors, and reinforcing institutional safeguards to uphold the Constitution’s intent.

Quick Q&A

Everything you need to know

Constitutional purpose: Article 176 of the Indian Constitution mandates that the Governor shall address the State Legislature at the commencement of the first session each year and the first session after a general election. This address is not a personal speech of the Governor but a formal statement of the elected government’s legislative agenda. It outlines proposed policies, programmes, and priorities for the coming year, thereby providing a roadmap for legislative business and public accountability.

Nature of the address: The content of the address is prepared and approved by the Council of Ministers. The Governor’s role is purely constitutional and ceremonial in this context, similar to the President’s address under Article 87 at the Union level. As clarified by constitutional experts and judicial precedents, the Governor bears no responsibility for the contents and cannot claim ownership or dissent over the policies articulated in it.

Institutional significance: The address symbolises the Governor’s position as an integral part of the State Legislature under Article 168. It reflects the Westminster model adopted by India, where the nominal head formally communicates the elected executive’s agenda to the legislature. When Governors refuse to deliver the Cabinet-approved address or selectively read it, the constitutional balance between the elected executive and the nominal head is disturbed, raising concerns about legislative obstruction and erosion of constitutional conventions.

Violation of constitutional mandate: A Governor’s refusal to deliver the Cabinet-approved address runs contrary to the explicit mandate of Article 176. Constitutional morality requires all constitutional functionaries to act within the spirit and letter of the Constitution, even where discretion appears politically tempting. By walking out or selectively reading the address, the Governor undermines the authority of the elected government and disrupts the formal commencement of legislative proceedings.

Judicial clarification: In Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016), the Supreme Court clearly held that the Governor’s address is an executive function performed strictly on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The judgment emphasised that discretionary powers of the Governor are limited and cannot be expanded through personal interpretation or political considerations. Any deviation, therefore, lacks constitutional sanction.

Broader implications: Such actions are particularly problematic in Opposition-ruled States, as seen recently in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala. They reinforce perceptions of partisan conduct and Centre-State imbalance. Over time, repeated disregard for constitutional conventions can normalise executive obstruction by nominal heads, weakening democratic accountability and potentially precipitating constitutional crises where legislative functioning itself is stalled.

Mode of appointment and tenure: Governors are appointed by the President and hold office during the President’s pleasure, which in practice translates to the confidence of the Union Council of Ministers. Unlike the President, who is indirectly elected and subject to impeachment by Parliament, Governors lack direct or indirect accountability to the State Legislature in which they function. This structural feature creates an inherent asymmetry in Centre-State relations.

Impact on neutrality: Because continuance in office depends on the Union government, Governors may be perceived — rightly or wrongly — as political agents rather than neutral constitutional referees. This perception is amplified in Opposition-ruled States, where Governors’ actions, such as withholding assent to Bills or refusing to deliver addresses, are interpreted as instruments of political pressure rather than constitutional caution.

Comparative insight: The relative absence of controversy around the President’s conduct highlights this institutional contrast. The President’s accountability to Parliament and the possibility of impeachment act as strong normative checks. In contrast, the Governor’s office lacks equivalent safeguards, making constitutional discipline more dependent on personal integrity and conventions than enforceable accountability. This design flaw explains the persistence of friction despite clear constitutional text and judicial guidance.

Arguments for retention: Supporters argue that the Governor’s address, though largely symbolic, affirms the Governor’s role as part of the legislature and reflects continuity with the Westminster parliamentary tradition. It provides a formal mechanism for the government to place its agenda on record and allows legislators to debate and move a motion of thanks, thereby enabling democratic scrutiny of executive priorities.

Arguments for reconsideration: Critics contend that the practice has lost functional relevance and has become a flashpoint for partisan confrontation. As noted by constitutional experts, at least two other legislative sessions each year commence without a Governor’s address, demonstrating that legislative functioning does not inherently depend on this ritual. Moreover, Article 175 already empowers Governors to address or send messages to the House when required, offering an alternative constitutional mechanism.

Balanced assessment: Rather than outright abolition, the real issue lies in preventing misuse of the office. Retaining the practice while reinforcing constitutional conventions, clearer judicial enforcement, and political accountability may be preferable. Abolishing the address risks treating a symptom while leaving the underlying institutional design and accountability deficits unaddressed.

Presidential intervention: The Constitution provides mechanisms to address gubernatorial misconduct. Under Article 160, the President is empowered to make provisions for the discharge of the Governor’s functions in contingencies not explicitly covered. Constitutional experts argue that when a Governor refuses to perform mandatory duties under Article 176, the President should intervene and direct compliance or require the Governor to demit office.

Role of Article 355: Article 355 imposes a duty on the Union to ensure that governance in States is carried on in accordance with the Constitution. If a Governor’s actions obstruct legislative functioning, it raises questions about whether this duty is being meaningfully fulfilled. Failure to act may indirectly legitimise partisan conduct and embolden further deviations from constitutional norms.

Case-based relevance: Recent incidents in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala illustrate how inaction can escalate tensions between Raj Bhavans and elected governments. While judicial review remains an option, timely political and constitutional intervention by the President is crucial to prevent erosion of federal trust. Ultimately, these episodes strengthen the case for deeper reforms in the appointment, accountability, and removal processes of Governors to safeguard constitutional governance.