Vietnamese Military's Preparations Amid Rising U.S. Tensions

The document reveals a deep strategic duality in Vietnam’s foreign policy, where outward diplomatic engagement coexists with inward military suspicion. While Vietnam has formally elevated ties with the United States to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the internal military assessment portrays the U.S. as a potentially belligerent power capable of unconventional warfare, political subversion, and even military intervention. This indicates that Hanoi differentiates sharply between public diplomacy and internal threat perception.

At the core of this worldview is Vietnam’s historical experience and regime security mindset. Having fought a prolonged and devastating war against the U.S. that ended only in 1975, the Vietnamese military retains what analysts call a “long memory.” This legacy shapes threat assessments that go beyond conventional military invasion to include non-kinetic threats such as ideological penetration, civil society influence, and external encouragement of political uprisings. The repeated references to “color revolutions” suggest that regime survival, rather than territorial defence alone, remains the primary concern.

From a broader international relations perspective, the document underscores Vietnam’s adherence to strategic autonomy. Hanoi seeks economic benefits, technology, and market access from the U.S. while refusing to align formally against China. This reflects a classic hedging strategy used by middle powers, where engagement with multiple major powers is combined with internal preparedness against all of them. For UPSC candidates, this illustrates how foreign policy is often shaped less by stated partnerships and more by underlying regime insecurities and historical experiences.

Vietnam’s prioritisation of color revolutions as a threat reflects a regime-centric conception of security. Unlike traditional military invasions, which are costly and visible, color revolutions operate through political mobilisation, civil society activism, media narratives, and external normative pressure. For a one-party socialist state, such movements are seen as existential because they directly challenge the legitimacy and continuity of Communist Party rule.

Historical precedents strongly influence this perception. Events such as the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004) and the People Power movement in the Philippines (1986) demonstrated how entrenched regimes could be overturned without foreign troops on the ground. Vietnamese planners interpret Western democracy promotion, human rights advocacy, and educational institutions like Fulbright University as potential vectors for such influence, even when these initiatives are officially benign or cooperative.

Importantly, Vietnam’s concern is not unique. Similar anxieties exist in China, Russia, and several Central Asian states, where internal dissent is often framed as externally orchestrated. However, the Vietnamese case is notable because it persists despite strong economic performance, poverty reduction, and high foreign investment. This suggests that regime insecurity is driven less by performance legitimacy and more by ideological rigidity and historical trauma. For policymakers, the implication is clear: political stability in such systems is maintained as much through controlling narratives and institutions as through economic success.

Vietnam’s foreign policy exemplifies a sophisticated but tension-filled balancing strategy. Economically, the U.S. is Vietnam’s largest export market, while China is its biggest overall trading partner and a powerful neighbour with which Vietnam has unresolved maritime disputes. Diplomatically, Vietnam has elevated relations with both to the highest tier, signalling a desire to avoid exclusive alignment with either power.

The leaked military document, however, exposes the limits of this balance. While China is described as a regional rival, the U.S. is portrayed as an existential threat due to its perceived inclination toward regime change. This asymmetry is striking because China has engaged in coercive actions in the South China Sea, whereas U.S. engagement has largely been economic and strategic. The explanation lies in regime logic: China, despite being assertive, does not challenge the Communist Party’s monopoly on power, whereas the U.S. is associated—rightly or wrongly—with democracy promotion.

The risk in this approach is strategic mistrust. Excessive suspicion of the U.S. may limit deeper cooperation in technology, defence, and supply-chain resilience, while underestimating China’s long-term leverage could constrain Vietnam’s autonomy. Nonetheless, Vietnam’s approach has so far delivered economic growth and diplomatic relevance. For India and other middle powers, Vietnam’s case highlights both the strengths and fragilities of hedging in a bipolar or multipolar world.

Vietnam’s foreign policy is deeply shaped by internal party dynamics, particularly the influence of conservative, military-aligned factions within the Communist Party. As noted by regional analysts, these groups have traditionally prioritised regime security and ideological control over external alignment opportunities. Their scepticism toward the U.S. explains why military planners continue to prepare for worst-case scenarios even amid diplomatic rapprochement.

These internal divisions often surface in public controversies, such as accusations against Fulbright University for allegedly promoting a color revolution. While the Foreign Ministry defended the institution, military-linked media amplified suspicions. This reflects an internal contest between technocratic, economically oriented factions and security-focused conservatives. Leadership changes, such as the rise of To Lam, can temporarily tilt the balance but do not erase institutional memories embedded in the military and security apparatus.

For UPSC aspirants, this case underlines an important analytical insight: states are not unitary actors. Foreign policy outcomes frequently emerge from internal bargaining among elites, institutions, and historical narratives. Understanding these internal drivers is essential for interpreting seemingly contradictory external behaviour.

Vietnam’s experience offers valuable lessons for India and other middle powers navigating great-power competition. First, it demonstrates the utility of strategic autonomy. By engaging simultaneously with rival powers, Vietnam has maximised economic opportunities while preserving policy flexibility. India’s own multi-alignment—seen in its ties with the U.S., Russia, and participation in forums like QUAD and SCO—mirrors this logic.

Second, the Vietnamese case highlights the importance of internal coherence. While external hedging can succeed economically, unresolved internal insecurities can limit strategic depth. For India, this underscores the need to align domestic political confidence, institutional trust, and foreign policy ambition. A confident polity is better positioned to leverage partnerships without excessive suspicion.

Finally, Vietnam’s story cautions against over-securitising foreign engagement. Excessive fear of ideological influence can stifle academic exchange, innovation, and soft power gains. For India, which aspires to be a leading power rather than merely a balancing one, the lesson is clear: strategic autonomy must be underpinned by democratic confidence and institutional resilience, not perpetual threat perception. This balance will define the effectiveness of middle powers in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific order.