Myanmar's Military-Scripted Elections and India's Dilemma

India faces a complex challenge in managing ties with Myanmar's military regime while balancing pragmatic interests and democratic principles.

Dhinesh Balasubramanian

•February 9, 2026•5 mins read

Myanmar’s war-time elections questioned

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1. Context: Myanmar’s Post-Coup Elections and the Illusion of Political Normalcy

Five years after the February 1, 2021 military coup, Myanmar’s junta conducted elections in three phases between December 2025 and January 2026, projecting them as a return to constitutional order. Predictably, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) secured victory, reinforcing perceptions of a pre-scripted political exercise rather than democratic renewal.

Voting was permitted in only 265 of 330 townships, largely confined to urban wards, as vast rural areas remain under resistance control. This selective participation significantly undermined representativeness and legitimacy, exposing the elections as an administrative mechanism rather than a political settlement.

The junta claimed a 55% voter turnout (13.14 million of 24 million eligible voters), a sharp fall from the nearly 70% turnout in 2015 and 2020. This decline signals popular rejection of military-managed processes rather than electoral fatigue.

In governance terms, elections held without territorial control, political inclusivity, and security cannot confer legitimacy; ignoring this risks mistaking procedural form for substantive democracy.

2. Issue: Systematic Exclusion and Militarisation of the Political Space

The credibility deficit was deepened by the junta-appointed Union Election Commission, which dissolved major opposition parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD), and jailed senior leaders such as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Win Myint. This effectively eliminated electoral competition.

Senior General Min Aung Hlaing fielded serving and retired military officials under the USDP banner, ensuring institutional continuity of military power through civilian facades. The Parliament to be formed within two months is therefore structurally skewed.

Elections conducted under incarceration, party bans, and armed conflict violate core democratic principles of choice and contestation.

The political logic is that when electoral arenas are militarised, elections become instruments of control, not representation, perpetuating instability rather than resolving it.

3. Context: Civil War Conditions and the Expanding Resistance

Since the coup, Myanmar has descended into widespread violence. At least 7,738 people have been killed, over 30,000 arrested, with 22,767 still in detention, and 11,497 sentenced, often on political charges. These figures highlight the human cost of authoritarian consolidation.

More than 1,13,000 houses and structures have been destroyed, especially in Sagaing and Magway, intensifying displacement and economic collapse. This brutality has catalysed resistance rather than compliance.

The People’s Defence Forces, operating alongside ethnic armed organisations, now control large territories, including 91 towns, significantly constraining the junta’s post-election authority.

Ignoring the conflict environment risks assuming state capacity where fragmentation prevails, leading to flawed diplomatic and policy assumptions.

4. Implications: Why Elections Have Not Altered Conflict Dynamics

Despite electoral claims, resistance groups retain decisive influence across Myanmar. The USDP’s victory does not translate into effective governance on the ground, suggesting that the conflict is likely to intensify rather than stabilise.

The elections have failed to produce a political settlement acceptable to key stakeholders, reinforcing cycles of violence and fragmentation.

This disconnect between formal institutions and territorial realities weakens state coherence and undermines prospects for economic recovery.

From a development perspective, political legitimacy is a prerequisite for stability; elections that bypass social consent deepen conflict traps.

5. India’s Position: Strategic Interests and Democratic Signalling

Myanmar is central to India’s Act East Policy, serving as a land bridge to Southeast Asia and sharing a 1,643-km border with four northeastern States. Consequently, instability directly affects India’s security and connectivity interests.

India’s official position, reiterated by MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal, maintains support for a “free, fair and inclusive” democratic process involving all stakeholders. This calibrated language avoids legitimising the elections while preventing diplomatic rupture.

New Delhi has also clarified that Indians present during the elections did so in a personal capacity, signalling deliberate political distance from the process.

The diplomatic logic lies in preserving strategic engagement without normative endorsement; ignoring this balance could either erode principles or compromise security.

6. Engagement without Endorsement: India’s Pragmatic Diplomacy

High-level engagement has continued despite political caution. At the SCO meeting in August 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, reviewing bilateral ties while emphasising inclusive elections.

India has also sustained humanitarian engagement, including relief and medical assistance under Operation Brahma following the March 2025 earthquake, and the establishment of a temporary field hospital.

This dual-track approach allows India to remain relevant and responsive without conferring political legitimacy on the junta.

Effective neighbourhood policy often requires separating humanitarian and strategic engagement from political endorsement.

7. Implications for India: Security, Refugees, and Connectivity

Instability in Myanmar directly impacts India’s internal security. India currently hosts 90,100 displaced Myanmar nationals in Mizoram and Manipur, straining State capacities in the absence of a national refugee policy.

Infrastructure projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway face persistent delays due to insecurity, forcing reassessment of timelines and risk exposure.

Non-traditional security threats have escalated, including narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, and cybercrime. Notably, 2,165 Indians have been rescued since 2022 from cyber scam and cyber slavery networks operating in Myanmar’s conflict zones.

Impacts:

Border instability and refugee inflows
Delayed strategic connectivity projects
Rise of transnational crime and cyber insecurity

Failure to address these spillovers holistically risks exporting instability into India’s border regions.

8. The Path Ahead: Managing a Fractured Neighbourhood

With ASEAN and several regional and Western actors withholding recognition of the election outcomes, India’s balanced approach gains relevance. Limited engagement with the regime, alongside outreach to local actors, allows flexibility amid uncertainty.

Myanmar’s elections have not marked a political turning point. Instead, they underline the persistence of state fragmentation and contested legitimacy.

For India, navigating this landscape requires sustained pragmatism, issue-based engagement, and readiness for prolonged instability.

Neighbourhood diplomacy in conflict settings demands patience, adaptability, and acceptance of imperfect outcomes.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s post-coup elections have reinforced, rather than resolved, political fragmentation and conflict. For India, they highlight the enduring challenge of balancing democratic principles with strategic imperatives in its neighbourhood. Sustained engagement, humanitarian commitment, and security preparedness will remain essential as New Delhi manages relations with a deeply fractured neighbour amid uncertain regional dynamics.

Quick Q&A

Everything you need to know

The 2025–26 elections in Myanmar represent an attempt by the military regime to manufacture political normalcy rather than restore democratic legitimacy.

Five years after the 2021 coup, the military organised elections under tightly controlled conditions: voting was allowed in only 265 of 330 townships, largely confined to urban areas, while rural regions remained under resistance influence. Major opposition parties such as the National League for Democracy (NLD) were dissolved, their leaders jailed, and political participation severely restricted. Unsurprisingly, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) secured sweeping victories, reinforcing the perception that the electoral process was scripted rather than competitive. The sharp decline in voter turnout—from about 70% in earlier democratic elections to around 55%—signals popular rejection rather than apathy.

Democratic legitimacy rests on inclusiveness, competition, and consent. These elections failed on all three counts. With thousands of political prisoners still detained, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and ongoing armed conflict across large swathes of territory, the elections neither reflected the popular will nor resolved the underlying political crisis. Instead, they deepened the credibility deficit of the junta’s governance framework.

In comparative perspective, such elections resemble other authoritarian transitions where ballots are used to confer a veneer of legality without substantive power-sharing. Therefore, Myanmar’s elections should be seen less as a democratic milestone and more as a strategic instrument to consolidate military rule amid civil war.

Myanmar’s elections place India at the intersection of democratic values and hard strategic interests, creating a persistent foreign policy dilemma.

India has consistently articulated support for democracy, inclusive dialogue, and rule-based political transitions in its neighbourhood. Endorsing or legitimising an election conducted under military repression would contradict these principles and weaken India’s normative standing, particularly as a democratic leader in the Global South. At the same time, Myanmar is indispensable to India’s Act East Policy, serving as a land bridge to Southeast Asia and sharing a 1,643-kilometre border with four northeastern States.

Security considerations further complicate the picture. Instability in Myanmar has direct spillover effects on India’s Northeast, including refugee inflows, arms trafficking, narcotics trade, and insurgent movement. A complete diplomatic rupture with Naypyitaw could reduce India’s ability to manage these risks or counter the influence of other external actors, notably China, which has maintained engagement with the junta.

Thus, India’s calibrated response—supporting democratic principles rhetorically while sustaining limited engagement operationally—reflects strategic pragmatism. The dilemma underscores a broader challenge in Indian foreign policy: balancing ideals with interests in an increasingly fractured regional order.

The elections are unlikely to stabilise Myanmar because they do not address the root causes of conflict—political exclusion, military dominance, and ethnic grievances.

Since the coup, violence has escalated dramatically, with thousands killed and resistance forces such as the People’s Defence Forces operating alongside ethnic armed organisations. These groups control or influence large territories, including 91 towns, and reject the junta’s authority. Elections conducted without their participation neither weaken resistance nor create incentives for reconciliation.

Moreover, repression has intensified rather than receded. Mass arrests, destruction of civilian infrastructure, and politically motivated sentencing have alienated large sections of society. In this context, elections function more as a legitimising tool for the military than as a conflict-resolution mechanism. Historical precedents—from sham elections in conflict zones elsewhere—suggest that exclusionary political processes often exacerbate insurgency rather than contain it.

Consequently, post-election Myanmar is likely to witness continued or intensified conflict. Without inclusive dialogue and meaningful power-sharing, electoral exercises alone cannot restore stability or national unity.

India’s balanced approach reflects pragmatic statecraft but is not without ethical and strategic trade-offs.

On the positive side, India has avoided outright endorsement of the junta’s electoral process, repeatedly emphasising that any transition must be free, fair, and inclusive. Simultaneously, it has continued limited engagement to safeguard security interests, connectivity projects, and humanitarian access. Initiatives such as Operation Brahma during the 2025 earthquake demonstrate India’s ability to remain engaged without legitimising the regime.

However, critics argue that continued high-level engagement, including meetings with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, risks normalising military rule. Such engagement may dilute India’s democratic messaging and create perceptions of inconsistency. There is also the risk that prolonged ambiguity could limit India’s influence with resistance groups and civil society actors shaping Myanmar’s future.

Overall, India’s approach is defensible given geopolitical realities, but it requires constant recalibration. The challenge lies in ensuring that pragmatism does not gradually overshadow principles, especially in a region where democratic backsliding is increasingly visible.

A multi-layered strategy combining humanitarian action, border management, and diplomatic outreach is essential.

First, India should institutionalise a coherent refugee policy framework to manage displaced Myanmar nationals humanely while easing the burden on border States such as Mizoram and Manipur. This would strengthen internal governance and enhance India’s moral credibility. Second, border security cooperation must be enhanced to counter narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, and cyber-scam networks, which have emerged as serious non-traditional security threats.

Third, India should sustain engagement with multiple stakeholders within Myanmar—not just the regime, but also ethnic groups and local administrations—to maintain channels of influence. Connectivity projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project should be reassessed with realistic timelines and risk mitigation strategies.

Finally, India should coordinate with ASEAN and like-minded regional actors to support inclusive dialogue rather than unilateral legitimisation. Such a calibrated, principle-based yet pragmatic approach would allow India to protect its interests while contributing constructively to regional stability.