1. Continuous Evolution of the IBC Framework
In a dynamic market economy, regulatory frameworks require periodic evaluation to address implementation gaps and changing economic conditions. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, represents one of India’s most significant structural reforms aimed at time-bound insolvency resolution and value maximisation.
Since its enactment, the government and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) have introduced multiple amendments to refine the framework. Recently, the IBBI released a discussion paper focusing on improving procedural clarity in the functioning of the Committee of Creditors (CoC).
The objective is to enhance transparency, reduce litigation, and make resolution outcomes more robust. Such reform signals regulatory responsiveness to operational challenges observed over time.
Regulatory adaptation is essential to maintain credibility and efficiency. Without continuous refinement, even well-designed reforms risk dilution in effectiveness due to procedural ambiguities.
2. Procedural Gaps in the Functioning of the Committee of Creditors (CoC)
The discussion paper identifies inconsistencies in the recording and documentation of CoC deliberations. The depth and detail of meeting minutes vary widely, and the rationale behind commercial decisions is often inadequately captured.
Lack of clarity in decision-making can lead to disputes, litigation, and delays at advanced stages of resolution. Since CoCs play a central role in evaluating and approving resolution plans, opaque processes undermine both accountability and legal certainty.
To address this, the paper proposes that CoCs must explicitly record:
- Expected recovery vis-à-vis fair value and liquidation value
- Adequacy of market discovery during the resolution process
- Credibility of the resolution applicant
- Certainty of implementation of the resolution plan
“… the CoC’s approval of a resolution plan is demonstrably conscious, informed, and supported by recorded rationale.” — IBBI Discussion Paper
Transparent documentation strengthens the defensibility of commercial decisions. If deliberations remain inadequately recorded, disputes and judicial scrutiny may continue to delay resolution outcomes.
3. Clarifications on Operational Continuity and Delayed Claims
The discussion paper reinforces that decisions during the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) must be guided by expected value maximisation and commercial prudence.
It also addresses ambiguity regarding delayed claims. Claims accepted by the resolution professional must:
- Be placed before the Adjudicating Authority (AA) within one week
- Be presented before the CoC for recommendation on treatment in the resolution plan
Previously, some claims were not placed before the AA due to the absence of CoC recommendations, creating procedural bottlenecks.
The paper further proposes the exclusion of related operational creditors from the CoC to avoid conflicts of interest and ensure objectivity.
Clarifying procedural steps reduces administrative discretion and potential disputes. Without such clarity, the insolvency process risks procedural inefficiency and inconsistent outcomes.
4. Time Delays: The Core Structural Challenge
While procedural improvements are important, delays remain the most critical challenge confronting the IBC framework.
The IBC envisaged a maximum resolution timeline of 330 days. However, as per the latest quarterly newsletter of the IBBI:
- Out of 1,376 CIRPs resulting in resolution plans (up to December last year),
- The average time taken was 619 days
This significant deviation from the statutory timeline undermines the core objective of time-bound resolution and value preservation.
Delays erode asset value, reduce recovery rates, and discourage potential bidders, thereby weakening the overall effectiveness of the insolvency regime.
Time-bound resolution is central to the IBC’s design. When timelines stretch significantly, the economic logic of preserving enterprise value is compromised.
5. Capacity Constraints in Adjudicatory Institutions
Experts have highlighted that capacity constraints at the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) are a major reason for delays.
Increased caseloads without proportional expansion in judicial and administrative capacity have slowed the adjudication process. Even well-structured resolution plans face bottlenecks at the approval and appellate stages.
Procedural clarity alone cannot offset institutional capacity deficits. Structural strengthening of tribunals is therefore essential.
Legal reform without adequate institutional capacity leads to implementation gaps. Unless adjudicatory capacity expands, procedural improvements may yield only marginal gains.
6. Broader Economic Implications of an Efficient Exit Mechanism
The IBC was designed to enable early resolution, preserve enterprise value, and facilitate efficient capital reallocation. A smooth exit mechanism strengthens credit discipline and improves the overall investment climate.
Efficient insolvency resolution reassures lenders, reduces non-performing assets, and enhances investor confidence. Conversely, persistent delays weaken trust in contractual enforcement.
A predictable and timely bankruptcy framework supports broader financial stability and economic growth.
An effective exit framework complements entry reforms. Without credible insolvency resolution, risk-taking and investment decisions remain constrained.
Conclusion
The IBBI’s proposed procedural reforms aim to enhance transparency, documentation, and operational clarity within the IBC framework. While these changes are necessary to reduce litigation and improve decision-making, they are insufficient in isolation.
Addressing capacity constraints at the NCLT and NCLAT is equally critical to restoring the time-bound nature of insolvency resolution. Strengthening both legal design and institutional capacity will ensure that the IBC continues to serve as a robust mechanism for value preservation, efficient capital allocation, and sustained economic growth.*
