Introduction
Air connectivity is no longer a luxury — it is an infrastructure imperative for equitable regional development. India, with the world's third-largest aviation market, still has vast Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities underserved by air travel. Launched in 2017, the UDAN (Ude Desh ka Aam Naagrik) scheme aimed to democratise aviation — yet a CAG report found only 7–10% of routes remained viable beyond the subsidy period, and 327 of 663 routes launched have since been discontinued. The Union Cabinet's approval of a ₹28,840 crore revamped UDAN scheme — a nearly six-fold increase — marks a significant policy correction, shifting from infrastructure-first to a sustained operations-and-connectivity model.
| Indicator | Value |
|---|---|
| Original UDAN outlay (2017) | ₹4,500 crore |
| Revised outlay (2026) | ₹28,840 crore |
| Routes launched since 2017 | 663 |
| Routes discontinued | 327 (49%) |
| Airports revived under UDAN | 95 |
| Airports fallen into disuse | 15 |
| Route viability beyond subsidy (CAG) | Only 7–10% |
| Subsidy period extended | 3 years → 5 years |
Background & Context
What is UDAN? UDAN — Ude Desh ka Aam Naagrik (Let the common citizen fly) — is India's Regional Connectivity Scheme (RCS) launched in 2017 under the National Civil Aviation Policy. Its core objectives:
- Revive underserved and unserved airports
- Make air travel affordable on regional routes
- Stimulate economic activity in Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities
The Bidding Mechanism Airlines compete for routes connecting smaller cities. The winning airline receives Viability Gap Funding (VGF) — a subsidy equivalent to 50% of seating capacity. In return, airlines must sell 50% of seats at a flat rate of ₹2,500 per flight hour — making regional air travel affordable.
The Subsidy Funding Shift Previously, subsidies were funded through a Regional Connectivity Scheme (RCS) levy embedded in airfares on non-UDAN routes — effectively taxing passengers on profitable routes to subsidise unprofitable ones. The revised scheme shifts this to direct exchequer funding — a more transparent and sustainable model.
Key Changes in Revamped UDAN (2026)
| Parameter | Original UDAN | Revamped UDAN 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| Total outlay | ₹4,500 crore | ₹28,840 crore |
| Subsidy period | 3 years | 5 years |
| Subsidy source | RCS levy on airfares | Direct exchequer funding |
| Airport focus | Revive unused airports | Redevelopment + O&M support |
| Airports targeted | 95 revived | 100 new redevelopments |
| Helipads proposed | — | 200 helipads (₹15 cr each) |
| Scope | Infrastructure only | Infrastructure + Operations + Maintenance |
Fund Allocation Breakdown
| Component | Outlay |
|---|---|
| Airline route subsidies (10 years) | ₹10,043 crore |
| Airport redevelopment (100 airports, 8 years) | ₹12,159 crore |
| Airport operations & maintenance (441 aerodromes) | ₹2,577 crore |
| Helipad development (200 helipads) | ₹3,661 crore |
| Aircraft procurement (HAL Dhruv, Dornier) | Remaining allocation |
Why the Original UDAN Underperformed
1. Route Viability Problem Only 7–10% of routes remained commercially viable after the subsidy window ended. Airlines exited routes the moment subsidies lapsed — revealing that demand on many routes was insufficient to sustain commercial operations independently.
2. Scale of Discontinuation
- 327 of 663 routes (49%) discontinued
- 15 of 95 airports revived fell back into disuse
- This represents significant sunk infrastructure costs with limited sustained economic benefit
3. Structural Design Flaws
- Three-year subsidy window was too short for route maturation and demand development
- RCS levy funding was opaque and regressive — burdening passengers on profitable routes
- No sustained support for airport operations and maintenance post-revival
- Insufficient last-mile connectivity to airports in remote areas
4. Demand-Side Gaps Regional air travel demand is constrained by:
- Low per-capita income in Tier-2/3 cities
- Poor surface connectivity to airports
- Lack of awareness and digital ticketing penetration
Policy Significance of Key Changes
1. Extended Subsidy Period (3 → 5 years) Gives routes longer runway for demand to mature organically before commercial viability is tested — addressing the primary cause of mass route discontinuation.
2. Exchequer Funding over RCS Levy
- More transparent fiscal accounting
- Removes regressive cross-subsidisation from air passengers
- Subjects UDAN spending to parliamentary scrutiny — improving accountability
3. Operations & Maintenance Support Capped at ₹3.06 crore per airport — addresses the post-revival collapse of low-traffic airports by funding ongoing operational costs, not just one-time infrastructure.
4. Helipad Development (200 helipads) Critical for last-mile connectivity in:
- North-East India
- Himalayan states (Uttarakhand, Himachal, J&K)
- Island territories (Andaman, Lakshadweep)
- Remote tribal areas
5. HAL Aircraft Procurement Procuring HAL Dhruv helicopters for Pawan Hans and HAL Dornier aircraft for Alliance Air supports domestic aerospace manufacturing — aligning UDAN with Aatmanirbhar Bharat and the defence-civil aviation convergence agenda.
Broader Implications
Economic Development
- Regional airports stimulate local tourism, trade, and investment
- Reduced travel time connects producers in smaller cities to larger markets
- Supports India's target of 220 operational airports by 2025 under the National Civil Aviation Policy
Equity & Inclusion
- Democratises air travel beyond metro cities
- Enables faster medical evacuation and disaster response in remote areas
- Connects tribal and border areas — with security and development co-benefits
Federal Dimension States share the financial burden of UDAN — state governments contribute to VGF and provide land, waived taxes, and reduced VAT on aviation turbine fuel. The Karnataka Minister's concern about Tier-2 airport viability post-UDAN reflects the federal fiscal stress when central subsidies lapse.
Challenges Ahead
- Demand sustainability: Extended subsidies delay but do not resolve the fundamental demand viability question on thin routes
- Airline capacity: Indian carriers face aircraft shortage and high operating costs — limiting willingness to operate marginal routes
- Airport O&M: ₹3.06 crore cap per airport may be insufficient for larger regional airports with higher maintenance costs
- Last-mile connectivity: Without surface transport to airports, air connectivity remains inaccessible to target populations
- Fiscal burden: ₹28,840 crore over 10 years is significant — requires robust monitoring to prevent fund diversion or underutilisation
Way Forward
- Demand-side interventions: Promote regional tourism packages, corporate travel incentives, and digital ticketing awareness
- Surface connectivity: Integrate UDAN airports with highway and rail networks under PM Gati Shakti
- Route rationalisation: CAG-informed analysis to identify genuinely viable routes versus permanently unviable ones — avoid subsidising the latter indefinitely
- State partnership: Stronger state-level accountability for airport upkeep and local demand generation
- Private sector: Encourage PPP models for airport O&M at commercially marginal airports
- Monitoring framework: Real-time route performance dashboard — discontinue non-performing routes early and redeploy subsidies
Conclusion
The revamped UDAN scheme represents an honest policy reckoning — acknowledging that infrastructure alone cannot sustain regional aviation without continuous operational support and longer demand incubation periods. The six-fold funding increase and shift to exchequer-based subsidies reflect fiscal seriousness, but the deeper challenge remains: creating genuine, self-sustaining air travel demand in India's smaller cities. UDAN's true measure of success is not the number of routes launched or airports revived — it is the percentage that remain operational five years after subsidies end. Until that metric improves dramatically from the current 7–10%, UDAN will remain a connectivity aspiration rather than a connectivity achievement.
