An Exploration of India’s Minerals Diplomacy for Clean Energy

Q: What are critical minerals , and why are they central to India’s clean energy and strategic ambitions?

Critical minerals are those minerals that are essential for economic growth, clean energy transitions, and national security , but whose supply chains are vulnerable to disruption. For India, this includes lithium, cobalt, nickel, rare earth elements and copper, which are indispensable for batteries, electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, electronics and defence technologies. The article highlights that India’s clean energy transition is impossible without imported critical minerals in the short to medium term. China’s dominance across mining, processing and export of many of these minerals, coupled with its tightening export controls, exposes India to geopolitical and supply-chain risks. This makes critical minerals not merely an economic issue, but a strategic and diplomatic concern . Thus, critical minerals sit at the intersection of energy security, industrial policy and geopolitics . India’s challenge is to secure reliable access while simultaneously building domestic capacity so that future transitions are not hostage to external shocks.

Q: Why is India pursuing a two-pronged strategy of domestic capacity building and overseas mineral partnerships?

India’s two-pronged strategy reflects a recognition that domestic self-reliance alone is insufficient in the short term , while external dependence without internal capability is risky in the long run. Developing mines, refining capacity and technology ecosystems domestically takes years, whereas clean energy targets and industrial demand are immediate. Hence, India is securing overseas access through bilateral and multilateral partnerships—such as with Australia, Japan, Africa and Latin America—while strengthening domestic frameworks through policy reforms and public sector initiatives like Khanij Bidesh India Limited (KABIL) . Australia’s reliability and Japan’s institutional resilience model illustrate how foreign partnerships can reduce vulnerability. This strategy balances urgency with sustainability . It allows India to hedge against supply shocks today while gradually creating long-term domestic capability, ensuring that future transitions are driven by choice rather than compulsion.

Q: How do different regional partnerships contribute differently to India’s critical minerals strategy?

The article makes it clear that India’s partnerships are functionally differentiated across the value chain . Australia, Canada, Africa and Latin America primarily support upstream activities such as ore extraction due to their abundant reserves and relatively stable mining environments. For instance, Australia’s lithium and cobalt projects and Argentina’s lithium exploration with KABIL strengthen raw material access. Midstream processing—the key choke point—is addressed through partnerships with Japan and West Asia . Japan offers a model of stockpiling, recycling and long-term planning, while Gulf countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia are investing heavily in refining and battery materials. These regions can process minerals sourced elsewhere, reducing India’s exposure to China-dominated refining stages. Downstream innovation and technology are best sourced from the EU and the U.S. , particularly in batteries, recycling and clean separation technologies. This layered approach shows India’s attempt to build a resilient, diversified and value-chain-wide ecosystem rather than relying on a single geography.

Q: Critically analyse the argument that ‘securing ore is not enough’ for India’s critical minerals security.

The statement reflects a crucial insight: the real vulnerability lies in processing and refining, not extraction alone . Even if India secures overseas mining assets, dependence on external players—particularly China—for refining and separation technologies can still disrupt supply chains. This has been evident globally, where China dominates rare-earth processing despite not holding the largest reserves. The strength of this argument lies in its emphasis on value-chain thinking . By focusing on midstream capabilities, India can convert raw access into strategic autonomy. However, building refining capacity is capital-intensive, environmentally sensitive and technologically complex, raising concerns related to ESG norms and local opposition. Therefore, while the argument is sound, its success depends on domestic regulatory reform, technological partnerships and ESG-compliant mining practices . Without these, processing ambitions may face the same delays that have historically plagued India’s industrial projects.

Q: What lessons can India draw from Japan’s response to China’s rare-earth export restrictions?

Japan’s experience offers a textbook case of strategic resilience through diversification and planning . When China restricted rare-earth exports to Japan a decade ago, Tokyo responded not with ad hoc diplomacy but with a long-term institutional strategy involving diversification of suppliers, stockpiling, recycling and sustained R&D investment. This approach reduced Japan’s dependence on China significantly over time and ensured continuity for its high-tech industries. India’s expanding cooperation with Japan—covering joint extraction, processing and stockpiling in India and third countries—reflects an attempt to internalise these lessons. The key takeaway for India is the importance of institutional continuity and patience . Resilience in critical minerals cannot be built through announcements alone; it requires decades of coordinated policy, industry participation and technological capability, areas where Japan provides a proven and credible template.

India's strategic partnerships aim to diversify mineral sources, ensuring resilience across critical supply chains for a sustainable future.

Surya

•January 15, 2026•6 mins read

India’s global critical minerals partnerships to secure clean energy future

1. Strategic Context: Critical Minerals and India’s Energy Transition

India’s clean energy transition is structurally dependent on imported critical minerals and rare earths. These minerals are indispensable for renewable energy technologies, electric mobility, defence manufacturing, and advanced electronics.

China’s tightening export controls have intensified supply risks, underscoring India’s vulnerability in upstream and midstream segments of mineral value chains. Consequently, mineral security has emerged as a core issue linking GS3 (energy, industry), GS2 (foreign policy), and national security.

In response, India has committed to diversifying mineral trade linkages, promoting responsible production, and supporting standards-based markets. If ignored, dependence on a narrow supplier base could derail clean energy goals and strategic autonomy.

The governance logic is clear: energy transition without mineral security is strategically fragile and economically unsustainable.

2. India’s Two-Pronged Strategy: Domestic Capability and External Access

India’s approach combines long-term domestic capacity building with immediate overseas sourcing. Over the last five years, New Delhi has pursued nearly a dozen bilateral and multilateral mineral partnerships while reforming domestic mineral policies.

This dual strategy recognises that domestic mining and processing will take time, while clean energy deployment requires assured supply now. Therefore, mineral diplomacy has become a critical instrument of economic statecraft.

However, partnerships vary widely in outcomes, raising questions about effectiveness, prioritisation, and strategic coherence. Without recalibration, India risks expending diplomatic capital without securing material gains.

Strategic partnerships must be judged by delivered capacity, not announced intent.

3. Australia and Japan: Reliable Models of Strategic Cooperation

Australia has emerged as India’s most reliable mineral partner due to political stability, large reserves, and a shared strategic outlook. Cooperation includes long-term supply discussions, joint research, and targeted investments.

Under the India–Australia Critical Minerals Investment Partnership (2022), five target projects in lithium and cobalt were identified for potential investment. This reflects movement beyond dialogue into project-level collaboration.

Japan offers a different but equally valuable model. After facing Chinese rare-earth export restrictions a decade ago, Tokyo adopted a comprehensive strategy of diversification, stockpiling, recycling, and sustained R&D. India–Japan cooperation has expanded beyond Indian Rare Earths Limited into joint extraction, processing, and stockpiling in India and third countries.

These partnerships show that institutional depth and long-term planning build resilience faster than ad hoc deals.

Comparative examples:

Australia: Joint investments and project identification in lithium and cobalt
Japan: Diversification, recycling, stockpiling, and technology-led resilience

4. Africa: Opportunity with Structural Risks

African countries offer mineral abundance alongside long-standing trade ties with India. Recent agreements with Namibia for lithium, rare earths, and uranium, and asset-acquisition talks in Zambia for copper and cobalt, signal India’s growing engagement.

African partners increasingly seek local value addition rather than raw extraction. This aligns with India’s need to build long-term supply chains but requires an industrial, not transactional, approach.

Without sustained investment, technology transfer, and local processing, India risks losing ground to competitors with more coordinated strategies.

Africa rewards patience and industrial commitment; short-termism weakens strategic credibility.

5. United States and the European Union: Technology-Rich but Complex Partners

Despite political signalling around “friend-shoring,” India–U.S. cooperation on critical minerals has struggled to move beyond dialogue. Recent U.S. tariffs, shifting trade rules, and restrictive incentives under the Inflation Reduction Act complicate predictability.

Nevertheless, initiatives such as the TRUST Initiative and the Strategic Minerals Recovery Initiative propose collaboration in rare-earth processing, battery recycling, and clean separation technologies. The U.S. remains more valuable as a downstream technology partner than a raw mineral supplier.

The European Union offers a regulatory-led model through the Critical Raw Materials Act, the European Battery Alliance, and its circular economy agenda. For India, deeper cooperation requires alignment with EU standards on transparency, lifecycle assessment, and environmental norms.

Advanced economies offer technology and standards, but demand regulatory convergence and policy stability.

6. West Asia and Russia: Complementary but Constrained Options

West Asia presents opportunities in the midstream segment. Countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia are investing in battery materials, refining capacity, and green hydrogen, backed by sovereign wealth funds acquiring mining assets globally.

For India, the Gulf could emerge as a processing hub for minerals sourced from Africa or Latin America. However, the absence of strong institutional frameworks limits depth.

Russia possesses significant reserves of rare earths, cobalt, and lithium, and scientific cooperation with India is longstanding. Yet sanctions, financing constraints, and logistical unpredictability restrict reliability. Russia can function as a hedge, not a foundation.

Diversification reduces risk, but reliability determines strategic weight.

7. Latin America and Canada: New Frontiers of Engagement

Latin America has become central to global copper, nickel, and rare-earth strategies. India has expanded engagement in Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Brazil, with both public and private investments.

Khanij Bidesh India Limited (KABIL) has signed a ₹200 crore exploration and development agreement with Argentina. However, competition is intense and engagement remains at an early stage.

Canada, following the restoration of diplomatic ties, emerges as a promising partner with reserves of nickel, cobalt, copper, and rare earths. A recently signed trilateral agreement with Australia and India enhances its potential, though political stability will be decisive.

Lasting presence in these regions requires value-chain partnerships, not extraction-only arrangements.

Key statistic:

KABIL investment in Argentina: ₹200 crore

8. The Central Lesson: Processing is the Real Choke Point

Across all partnerships, a consistent lesson emerges: securing ore alone is insufficient. The primary vulnerability lies in mineral processing and refining, where global capacity is highly concentrated.

Without domestic midstream capability, India remains exposed to supply disruptions regardless of upstream diversification. Technology transfer, innovation, and on-ground project execution matter more than announcements.

A country-specific approach can distribute risk: upstream sourcing from Africa, Australia, Canada, and Latin America; midstream processing with Japan and West Asia; downstream technology with the EU and U.S.; and diversification via Russia.

Strengthening domestic frameworks for responsible mining, ESG compliance, and transparency is essential, as these factors increasingly shape international partnerships.

Control over processing determines control over the energy transition.

Conclusion

India has constructed an extensive web of critical minerals partnerships across continents. The strategic challenge now is to deepen effective partnerships, recalibrate weak ones, and anchor diplomacy in processing capacity, technology, and long-term certainty. A coherent value-chain strategy, backed by domestic regulatory strength, will be decisive for India’s clean energy transition and strategic autonomy.

Quick Q&A

Everything you need to know

Critical minerals are those minerals that are essential for economic growth, clean energy transitions, and national security, but whose supply chains are vulnerable to disruption. For India, this includes lithium, cobalt, nickel, rare earth elements and copper, which are indispensable for batteries, electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, electronics and defence technologies.

The article highlights that India’s clean energy transition is impossible without imported critical minerals in the short to medium term. China’s dominance across mining, processing and export of many of these minerals, coupled with its tightening export controls, exposes India to geopolitical and supply-chain risks. This makes critical minerals not merely an economic issue, but a strategic and diplomatic concern.

Thus, critical minerals sit at the intersection of energy security, industrial policy and geopolitics. India’s challenge is to secure reliable access while simultaneously building domestic capacity so that future transitions are not hostage to external shocks.

India’s two-pronged strategy reflects a recognition that domestic self-reliance alone is insufficient in the short term, while external dependence without internal capability is risky in the long run. Developing mines, refining capacity and technology ecosystems domestically takes years, whereas clean energy targets and industrial demand are immediate.

Hence, India is securing overseas access through bilateral and multilateral partnerships—such as with Australia, Japan, Africa and Latin America—while strengthening domestic frameworks through policy reforms and public sector initiatives like Khanij Bidesh India Limited (KABIL). Australia’s reliability and Japan’s institutional resilience model illustrate how foreign partnerships can reduce vulnerability.

This strategy balances urgency with sustainability. It allows India to hedge against supply shocks today while gradually creating long-term domestic capability, ensuring that future transitions are driven by choice rather than compulsion.

The article makes it clear that India’s partnerships are functionally differentiated across the value chain. Australia, Canada, Africa and Latin America primarily support upstream activities such as ore extraction due to their abundant reserves and relatively stable mining environments. For instance, Australia’s lithium and cobalt projects and Argentina’s lithium exploration with KABIL strengthen raw material access.

Midstream processing—the key choke point—is addressed through partnerships with Japan and West Asia. Japan offers a model of stockpiling, recycling and long-term planning, while Gulf countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia are investing heavily in refining and battery materials. These regions can process minerals sourced elsewhere, reducing India’s exposure to China-dominated refining stages.

Downstream innovation and technology are best sourced from the EU and the U.S., particularly in batteries, recycling and clean separation technologies. This layered approach shows India’s attempt to build a resilient, diversified and value-chain-wide ecosystem rather than relying on a single geography.

Despite political alignment and rhetoric around “friend-shoring”, India–U.S. cooperation on critical minerals has struggled due to policy volatility and protectionist measures. Recent U.S. tariffs on Indian goods, shifting trade rules and restrictive incentives under the Inflation Reduction Act have made long-term planning difficult for Indian stakeholders.

Unlike Australia or Japan, where frameworks are stable and institutionalised, U.S. trade policy changes frequently with political cycles. This undermines predictability, which is crucial for capital-intensive mining and processing projects that require long investment horizons.

That said, the U.S. remains important as a technology and innovation partner. Initiatives like the TRUST Initiative and the Strategic Minerals Recovery Initiative indicate potential, but without regulatory clarity and consistency, Washington can at best be a complementary partner rather than the cornerstone of India’s minerals strategy.

The statement reflects a crucial insight: the real vulnerability lies in processing and refining, not extraction alone. Even if India secures overseas mining assets, dependence on external players—particularly China—for refining and separation technologies can still disrupt supply chains. This has been evident globally, where China dominates rare-earth processing despite not holding the largest reserves.

The strength of this argument lies in its emphasis on value-chain thinking. By focusing on midstream capabilities, India can convert raw access into strategic autonomy. However, building refining capacity is capital-intensive, environmentally sensitive and technologically complex, raising concerns related to ESG norms and local opposition.

Therefore, while the argument is sound, its success depends on domestic regulatory reform, technological partnerships and ESG-compliant mining practices. Without these, processing ambitions may face the same delays that have historically plagued India’s industrial projects.

Japan’s experience offers a textbook case of strategic resilience through diversification and planning. When China restricted rare-earth exports to Japan a decade ago, Tokyo responded not with ad hoc diplomacy but with a long-term institutional strategy involving diversification of suppliers, stockpiling, recycling and sustained R&D investment.

This approach reduced Japan’s dependence on China significantly over time and ensured continuity for its high-tech industries. India’s expanding cooperation with Japan—covering joint extraction, processing and stockpiling in India and third countries—reflects an attempt to internalise these lessons.

The key takeaway for India is the importance of institutional continuity and patience. Resilience in critical minerals cannot be built through announcements alone; it requires decades of coordinated policy, industry participation and technological capability, areas where Japan provides a proven and credible template.