UDAN Scheme — Regional Air Connectivity and Implementation Gaps

"Aviation infrastructure alone does not guarantee connectivity. The State suffers from a lack of realistic planning, route-viability analysis, and airline engagement at smaller locations." — Samajwadi Party Spokesperson, Nasser Salim

India has one of the world's fastest-growing aviation markets, yet tier-2 and tier-3 cities remain poorly connected. The UDAN scheme, launched in 2016 to democratise air travel, has seen significant infrastructure investment — yet in Uttar Pradesh alone, 8 of 17 technically operational airports have zero scheduled traffic, exposing a deep gap between inauguration optics and functional connectivity.

Background & Context

The Regional Connectivity Scheme (RCS) – UDAN (Ude Desh Ka Aam Nagrik) was launched to fulfil a simple promise: make air travel affordable and accessible to ordinary citizens in underserved cities. The scheme operates through:

• Competitive bidding — airlines bid for routes connecting tier-2/3 cities
• Viability Gap Funding (VGF) — government subsidy to airlines covering the revenue shortfall on unviable routes
• Fare caps — 50% of seats capped at ₹2,500 per flight hour
• Exclusive 3-year contracts — to encourage airline commitment on awarded routes

Despite this architecture, the scheme has struggled to sustain operations beyond inauguration in several states, with Uttar Pradesh emerging as the most prominent case study in implementation failure.

Key Failures

1. Route Viability Misjudgement

No demand assessment done
        ↓
Routes awarded to cities with limited business/tourism traffic
        ↓
Strong road/rail alternatives already exist
        ↓
Passengers never materialise → Airlines exit

2. Operational Dependencies Ignored

All UDAN routes linked to single hub (Lucknow Airport)
        ↓
Lucknow runway closed for resurfacing / poor visibility
        ↓
Entire regional network shuts down simultaneously
        ↓
Foreseeable risk — never mitigated in route planning

3. Airline Fragility

Multiple critical routes awarded to single airline (FlyBig)
        ↓
Small fleet + weak financials = systemic concentration risk
        ↓
FlyBig ceases operations (December 2025)
        ↓
All dependent routes collapse together

4. Infrastructure Without Ecosystem

Airport built → Runway, terminal, equipment installed
        ↓
High-cost maintenance continues regardless of traffic
        ↓
Zero flights → Zero revenue → Pure fiscal drain
        ↓
Public money spent with no connectivity outcome

5. Political Inauguration Over Functional Planning

Election cycle approaches
        ↓
Airport inaugurated → Optics of development created
        ↓
Flights operate briefly (Kushinagar: 52 ops in 10 days)
        ↓
Elections conclude → Flights stop → Airport goes dormant

Governance and Policy Gaps

What Is Working

It would be analytically incomplete to dismiss UDAN entirely. Uttar Pradesh recorded 60 lakh air passengers between April–August 2025, with 14.6% YoY growth. Gorakhpur and Agra airports recorded ~63% growth — demonstrating that where genuine demand exists, regional connectivity can succeed. The scheme's architecture — VGF, fare caps, exclusive contracts — is broadly sound. The failure is in implementation quality, not conceptual design.

Way Forward

• Mandatory demand feasibility study before any airport development under UDAN — including passenger origin-destination surveys and modal competition analysis
• Multi-airline bidding requirement on routes above a minimum traffic threshold — preventing single-airline dependency
• Performance-linked VGF disbursement — funding tied to actual flight operations and passenger numbers, not just route award
• Hub resilience planning — backup routing protocols when hub airports face disruption
• Transparent public dashboard on UDAN route status — operational, suspended, or discontinued — to prevent misinformation
• Sunset review mechanism — routes with sustained low demand should trigger a formal review rather than silent abandonment

Conclusion

The UDAN scheme embodies a genuinely inclusive vision — air travel for the common citizen, not just the elite. Its failure in several UP cities is not a failure of intent but of execution discipline: airports built without demand assessment, routes awarded to fragile airlines, and inaugurations timed to political cycles rather than operational readiness. Public money — hundreds of crores — has been spent on airports that serve no passengers. A scheme designed to democratise aviation cannot achieve that goal through infrastructure alone; it requires realistic planning, accountable implementation, and honest assessment of where air connectivity is genuinely viable. The lesson from UP is not that regional aviation cannot work — it is that it cannot be wished into existence by ribbon-cutting alone.