Centre's Anti-Naxal Initiatives: Tales from Odisha's Forests

A decade of courage, sacrifice, and the gradual dismantling of Maoist strongholds in Odisha's challenging terrain.

Gopi

•February 25, 2026•5 mins read

Odisha’s anti-Naxal fight: From insurgent strongholds to restored state control

Not Started

1. Context: Decline of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) and the Centre’s Deadline

The Union Government has set March 31 as the deadline to eliminate Left Wing Extremism (LWE), once described as India’s gravest internal security threat. Over the past decade, sustained counter-insurgency operations have significantly weakened Maoist presence in several affected States, including Odisha.

In Odisha, districts like Malkangiri, bordering Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh, were long considered Maoist strongholds. Areas such as Swabhiman Anchal, once geographically isolated and cut off by water and forests, served as operational bases for CPI (Maoist).

Official estimates indicate that while nearly 800 Naxal cadres were active across almost half of Odisha’s 30 districts at one time, the number has now reduced to fewer than 40, with most senior leaders eliminated.

This reflects a broader internal security transition — from high-intensity insurgency to residual threat management.

The decline in cadre strength signals operational success, but premature withdrawal or complacency could risk regrouping. Sustained vigilance and administrative consolidation remain essential.

2. Operational Architecture of Anti-Naxal Strategy

The fight against LWE in Odisha relied heavily on specialized policing models. Officers trained with the Greyhounds (Andhra Pradesh’s elite anti-Naxal force) later formed Odisha’s Special Operations Group (SOG).

Counter-insurgency involved long-duration foot patrols — sometimes 70 km treks over four days — across hostile terrain. Teams operated in small groups (around 24 personnel per group), often without reliable communication networks.

Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs), including the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and Border Security Force (BSF), supported Odisha Police in coordinated operations. Odisha also functioned as a transit corridor for Maoists relocating from Andhra Pradesh to Chhattisgarh under security pressure.

Operational success relied on:

Intensive intelligence gathering
Terrain familiarity
Inter-state coordination
Tactical mobility

However, Maoists maintained a formidable ground intelligence network, making even routine movement risky.

Counter-insurgency effectiveness depends on coordination, mobility, and intelligence dominance. Weak inter-agency synergy or intelligence lapses could allow insurgent regrouping.

3. Human Cost of Internal Security Operations

Gallantry awards reflect operational bravery but also underscore the personal cost borne by security personnel. Officers in Odisha earned multiple medals, including the President’s Police Medal for Gallantry, often after surviving life-threatening encounters.

One such incident involved a 2008 landmine blast that killed 17 police personnel ahead of a convoy. The subsequent firefight illustrates the high-risk, battlefield-like conditions of anti-Naxal operations.

“Between 2005 and 2015, no one in the force felt safe.” — Subrat Majhi

Communication blackouts, prolonged deployment in forests, and inability to contact families intensified psychological stress. Families endured prolonged uncertainty and trauma.

The human dimension of internal security includes:

Mental stress on personnel and families
High fatality risks
Long separation from civilian life
Uncertainty in remote operational zones

Internal security policies that ignore personnel welfare risk burnout, morale decline, and operational inefficiency. Sustainable counter-insurgency requires institutional support systems.

4. Maoist Support Networks and Ground Realities

During peak insurgency years (2005–2015), Maoists enjoyed substantial support in villages. Militia presence and local sympathisers enabled real-time intelligence flows, making infiltration and ambushes frequent.

Standing instructions reportedly emphasized “trust no one,” including villagers. Even routine triggers — such as barking dogs — could alert Maoist networks.

Senior officers often avoided uniformed visits and shifted vehicles to evade detection. This reflected the depth of insurgent influence and parallel authority structures in affected districts.

However, extremist groups also allegedly amplified instances of alleged excesses by security forces to widen mistrust between the police and local communities.

This dual dynamic — insurgent intimidation and mistrust of state forces — entrenched conflict.

Where state legitimacy is weak and local trust absent, insurgency sustains itself. Without rebuilding civil-state relations, security gains remain fragile.

5. Strategic Shift: From Force Dominance to Trust-Building

In the latter phase of anti-Naxal operations, emphasis shifted from pure kinetic operations to trust-building and governance outreach.

Security forces increasingly focused on:

Building rapport with local communities
Restoring administrative presence
Ensuring service delivery
Integrating remote regions into mainstream development

This transition from “area domination” to “confidence restoration” significantly weakened Maoist influence. As state legitimacy increased, Maoist recruitment and support networks diminished.

The case demonstrates that counter-insurgency success requires both:

Hard power (security operations)
Soft power (development and trust-building)

Security operations can suppress violence, but durable peace requires legitimacy. Ignoring socio-political integration risks cyclical insurgency.

6. Governance and Federal Dimensions

LWE posed multi-State and federal challenges, affecting inter-state borders such as Odisha–Chhattisgarh–Andhra Pradesh. Coordinated operations between State police and CAPFs were crucial.

The case highlights:

Importance of Centre–State cooperation
Need for intelligence sharing across borders
Strategic role of specialized forces (Greyhounds model)
Infrastructure and connectivity in remote regions

The transformation of Swabhiman Anchal from a “cut-off area” into an administratively accessible region underscores the governance-security-development nexus.

This has implications for:

GS2: Centre-State relations and internal security
GS3: Security challenges and their management
Essay: Development as the best antidote to extremism

Internal security in federal systems requires coordination rather than centralization alone. Fragmented approaches weaken counter-insurgency outcomes.

7. Key Takeaways for Prelims

Odisha once had nearly 800 active Maoist cadres; now reduced to <40.
Malkangiri district was a major Maoist stronghold.
Swabhiman Anchal was geographically isolated and Maoist-dominated.
Greyhounds: Elite anti-Naxal force from undivided Andhra Pradesh.
CAPFs involved: CRPF, BSF.
2008 landmine blast killed 17 police personnel.

Conclusion

The Odisha experience illustrates that eliminating Left Wing Extremism is not merely a military objective but a governance milestone. Sustained security operations, inter-state coordination, and community trust-building together transformed a conflict zone into a stabilizing region.

Long-term success will depend on consolidating developmental gains, strengthening institutional legitimacy, and preventing residual extremist revival — ensuring that security transitions into durable peace and inclusive development.

Quick Q&A

Everything you need to know

Left Wing Extremism (LWE), led primarily by the CPI (Maoist), emerged from a mix of socio-economic deprivation, geographical isolation, and governance deficits. Regions like Malkangiri—characterised by dense forests, difficult terrain, tribal marginalisation, and poor connectivity—became fertile ground for Maoist mobilisation. The 'cut-off' Swabhiman Anchal area, surrounded by water and hills, provided strategic depth and natural protection, enabling insurgents to build strongholds and parallel authority structures.

Between 2005 and 2015, Maoists reportedly enjoyed deep village-level support and maintained formidable ground intelligence networks. Weak State presence, limited infrastructure, and distrust between local communities and security forces allowed them to entrench themselves. Odisha also functioned as a transit corridor linking Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, strengthening inter-state Maoist coordination.

The decline of LWE can be attributed to a multi-pronged strategy: sustained security operations by Odisha Police, Greyhounds-trained units, CRPF and BSF; improved intelligence coordination; infrastructure expansion; and trust-building initiatives with local communities. The reported reduction of active cadres from around 800 to fewer than 40 reflects both kinetic operations and governance penetration into previously inaccessible regions.

The creation of specialised units such as the Greyhounds in undivided Andhra Pradesh and Odisha’s Special Operations Group (SOG) marked a shift from conventional policing to specialised counter-insurgency tactics. These forces were trained in jungle warfare, long-duration patrols, intelligence-based strikes, and small-team mobility, enabling them to operate effectively in dense forest terrain.

Operational strategies included multi-day foot patrols covering up to 70 km, strict communication discipline, role-based briefings before operations, and structured debriefings afterward to assess performance and identify acts of gallantry. The emphasis on anonymity, surprise, and terrain familiarity reduced vulnerability to ambushes such as landmine blasts and sniper fire from elevated vantage points.

The success of such forces demonstrates the importance of capacity building, specialised training, and local intelligence integration in counter-insurgency. The Odisha experience mirrors Andhra Pradesh’s earlier success, where focused, intelligence-driven operations significantly weakened Maoist networks.

Counter-insurgency is not solely a military exercise; it is fundamentally about winning the confidence of the local population. Maoists historically relied on village-level support networks, sympathisers, and militia groups for shelter, intelligence, and recruitment. Without breaking this social base, security operations alone would yield limited long-term success.

In districts like Malkangiri, distrust between villagers and police was aggravated by geographical isolation and allegations of excesses during area domination exercises. Extremist groups often amplified such incidents to deepen mistrust. Recognising this, authorities increasingly focused on outreach, civic action programmes, infrastructure development, and improved service delivery.

Trust-building measures—such as better road connectivity, welfare delivery, and increased administrative presence—helped weaken Maoist ideological appeal. The reduction in cadre strength reflects not just tactical victories but also a gradual shift in local perceptions, demonstrating that sustainable peace requires integrating security with development.

Anti-Naxal operations involve significant operational and human challenges. Personnel operate in hostile terrain marked by landmines, ambushes, and limited communication networks. The 2008 landmine blast killing 17 personnel illustrates the high-risk environment. Long treks, isolation from families, and psychological stress add to the burden, as highlighted by officers who described constant uncertainty and minimal contact with loved ones.

From a policy perspective, such operations raise concerns about adequate training, technological support (drones, surveillance), and welfare mechanisms for personnel and their families. Allegations of excesses during patrolling also underscore the need for strict adherence to human rights norms to prevent alienation of local communities.

Thus, internal security policy must balance operational effectiveness with ethical accountability. Modernisation of police forces, mental health support systems, better equipment, and transparent grievance redressal mechanisms are essential to sustain morale while maintaining democratic legitimacy.

Malkangiri serves as an instructive case of coordinated counter-insurgency involving State police, central armed police forces, and inter-state intelligence sharing. Odisha Police worked alongside the CRPF and BSF, while coordination with Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh addressed the cross-border movement of cadres. This demonstrates the importance of cooperative federalism in tackling insurgencies that transcend administrative boundaries.

Operational coordination was complemented by governance measures such as infrastructure development and improved administrative outreach in previously inaccessible areas like Swabhiman Anchal. The integration of security operations with developmental interventions reduced Maoist influence and restored state authority.

The case underscores that eliminating LWE requires a comprehensive strategy: sustained security pressure, development initiatives, institutional coordination, and community engagement. It reflects how Centre-State synergy, when combined with local intelligence and grassroots outreach, can transform a once-volatile region into a stabilised administrative zone.