Critically analyse Pakistan’s ‘strategic depth’ doctrine in light of recent developments with the Taliban government.

Pakistan’s ‘strategic depth’ doctrine envisaged a friendly regime in Afghanistan to counter Indian influence and provide geopolitical leverage in the event of conflict. Supporting the Taliban was seen as a means to ensure a pliant government in Kabul. However, recent developments reveal the limitations of this approach.Strengths of the doctrine (in theory):Counterbalance India’s diplomatic presence in Afghanistan.Ensure a secure western frontier.Enhance regional bargaining power. However, in practice, the Taliban have asserted independence, refused to recognise the Durand Line, and engaged diplomatically with India. Moreover, the rise of the TTP has undermined Pakistan’s internal security.Thus, the doctrine appears to have backfired. Rather than securing depth, Pakistan faces instability on both its eastern and western borders. The episode highlights the risks of using non-state actors as instruments of foreign policy.

As a foreign policy analyst, how would you assess the prospects for regional mediation in the current Pakistan–Afghanistan conflict?

Regional actors such as Iran, Russia, and China have called for dialogue and offered mediation. Their involvement reflects concerns about spillover instability, refugee flows, and extremist mobilisation. China, in particular, has strategic stakes in both countries due to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and security concerns in Xinjiang.Successful mediation would require confidence-building measures such as:Revival of border coordination mechanisms.Joint action against TTP safe havens.Formal dialogue on Durand Line management without immediate resolution.However, deep mistrust and nationalist rhetoric—evident in the ‘open war’ narrative—pose obstacles.The case underscores the complexity of post-conflict statecraft: insurgent movements transitioning to governance often recalibrate alliances. Sustainable peace will depend on institutionalised dialogue rather than tactical retaliation, making regional mediation both necessary and challenging.

The Deterioration of Pakistan-Taliban Relations: An Analysis

Q: Why is the Durand Line dispute central to the current ‘open war’ narrative between Islamabad and Kabul?

The Durand Line, drawn in 1893 between British India and Afghanistan, divides Pashtun tribal areas and has historically been contested by successive Afghan governments. While the issue was muted during the Taliban insurgency phase, it became a formal inter-state dispute after 2021 when the Taliban assumed state authority.Pakistan considers the Durand Line an internationally recognised boundary, while the Taliban have refused to formally endorse it. Border fencing by Pakistan and troop deployments have led to frequent skirmishes, including serious clashes in October 2025 and recent air strikes. The transformation of a historical grievance into active military confrontation underscores how territorial disputes gain renewed urgency when non-state actors become state actors.The issue is significant because it involves questions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and ethnic identity. In a region already marked by militancy and fragile governance, unresolved boundary disputes can escalate rapidly into open conflict, as seen in the recent exchange of air strikes.

Q: How has the resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) altered Pakistan’s security calculus?

The resurgence of the TTP has fundamentally altered Pakistan’s internal security environment. Although organisationally distinct from the Afghan Taliban, the TTP shares ideological affinities and draws inspiration from the Taliban’s 2021 victory. Its objective is to establish a similar Islamist regime in Pakistan’s tribal belt.Following the collapse of a Taliban-brokered ceasefire in 2022, violence surged. According to the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, around 400 people—mostly security personnel—were killed in TTP attacks last year. Pakistan accuses Kabul of harbouring TTP fighters, while the Taliban deny the charges. Islamabad’s cross-border strikes targeting alleged TTP camps have triggered retaliatory warnings from Kabul, escalating tensions.This dynamic illustrates a classic case of blowback: support for one militant group (Afghan Taliban) has indirectly strengthened another hostile group (TTP). Pakistan now faces a dual challenge—managing cross-border militancy while avoiding full-scale interstate conflict.

Uncovering how the allies turned adversaries, leading to heightened conflict and challenges in South-Central Asia.

pocketias team

•February 28, 2026•6 mins read

Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions erupt into open conflict

Not Started

1. Escalation to Open Hostility: From Allies to Adversaries

Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared that relations with Afghanistan had reached “open war” after Pakistan carried out air strikes in Kabul, Kandahar and Paktia. These strikes followed cross-border attacks and retaliatory actions by both sides, reflecting a rapid deterioration in bilateral ties.

Until 2021, Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban were closely aligned. The Taliban leadership operated from Pakistani territory during their insurgency against U.S. and Afghan government forces. Islamabad expected that the Taliban’s return to power would secure its strategic interests in Afghanistan.

However, four years after the Taliban captured Kabul, relations have transformed from cooperation to confrontation. The shift underscores how insurgent alliances often fracture once power equations change and state-to-state issues replace ideological solidarity.

“Now it is open war between us and you.” — Khawaja Asif, Pakistan’s Defence Minister

When non-state actors transition into state authority, strategic expectations often collide with sovereignty concerns. Ignoring this transformation leads to miscalculation, as seen in Pakistan’s assumption that the Taliban would remain a pliant partner.

2. The Durand Line Dispute: Historical Legacy and Border Clashes

The Durand Line, a 2,640-km border drawn in 1893 between British India and Afghanistan, remains a core structural dispute. No Afghan government since 1973 has formally accepted this boundary, which divides Pashtun tribal regions.

While the issue was muted during the Taliban insurgency phase, it resurfaced once the Taliban assumed state power. As rulers, the Taliban adopted Afghanistan’s traditional position of rejecting the Durand Line as a legitimate international boundary.

Frequent skirmishes, including serious clashes in October 2025, illustrate how historical territorial disputes can intensify when political authority shifts. What was once a background issue has become central to bilateral tensions.

Key Structural Factor:

2,640-km Durand Line remains disputed
Rejected by successive Afghan governments since 1973
Escalated into periodic armed clashes (e.g., October 2025)

Territorial disputes acquire sharper edges when sovereignty and nationalism are invoked by ruling regimes. Failure to address such historical fault lines risks institutionalising instability along borders.

3. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): The Security Dilemma

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ideologically aligned but organisationally distinct from the Afghan Taliban, poses a major internal security threat to Pakistan. While Islamabad supported the Afghan Taliban, it has consistently opposed the TTP.

After the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, the TTP gained renewed momentum. Although a ceasefire was brokered in 2022, it collapsed, leading to intensified violence in Pakistan’s border regions.

According to the Pak Institute for Peace Studies:

At least 400 people were killed in TTP attacks last year
Most victims were security personnel
It was among the most violent years in a decade

Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of sheltering TTP militants, an allegation Kabul denies. Cross-border strikes by Pakistan targeting alleged TTP camps have triggered retaliatory responses from Afghanistan, creating a cycle of violence.

Security Challenges:

Cross-border militancy
Sovereignty violations through air strikes
Deteriorating internal security in Pakistan’s tribal areas

Supporting militant groups for external leverage while combating similar actors internally creates a strategic contradiction. If unresolved, it deepens insecurity and erodes state authority.

4. The “Strategic Depth” Doctrine and Its Reversal

Pakistan historically viewed Afghanistan through the lens of “strategic depth” — the idea of ensuring a friendly regime in Kabul to counter India’s influence and secure western borders.

The Taliban’s return in 2021 was initially perceived as a geopolitical success. Then Prime Minister Imran Khan remarked that Afghans had “broken the shackles of slavery,” reflecting Islamabad’s optimism.

However, the Taliban have asserted autonomy rather than acting as a client regime. Instead of strategic depth, Pakistan now faces:

Border instability
Strengthened insurgent threats (TTP)
Reduced diplomatic leverage

This shift illustrates the limits of proxy-based regional strategies in a multipolar and sovereignty-driven environment.

Foreign policy strategies built on regime dependence rather than institutional engagement often collapse once political realities change. Overreliance on non-state proxies can generate long-term strategic costs.

5. The India Factor: Geopolitical Realignment

Another emerging dimension is the Taliban’s warming ties with India. Unlike the 1990s, Taliban 2.0 have adopted a more pragmatic foreign policy.

Key developments include:

India hosted Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi last year.
The Taliban appointed an envoy to head their mission in New Delhi.
India has engaged without formal recognition.

Pakistan perceives this outreach as a dilution of its influence. The Defence Minister alleged that the Taliban had become a “proxy for India,” highlighting Islamabad’s strategic anxieties.

This evolving triangular dynamic reshapes South Asian geopolitics, particularly in the context of India–Pakistan rivalry.

Geopolitical alignments are fluid. When smaller states diversify partnerships, dominant neighbours may perceive strategic encirclement, intensifying regional competition.

6. Regional and International Implications

The escalation has drawn concern from regional powers such as Iran, Russia, and China, who have called for dialogue and offered mediation. Prolonged instability could destabilise the wider South-Central Asian region.

Potential consequences include:

Increased cross-border militancy
Refugee flows
Disruption of trade corridors
Complications for regional connectivity initiatives

For India, the situation has dual implications: security vigilance along western fronts and diplomatic engagement in Afghanistan without formal recognition.

Broader Impacts:

Regional security volatility
Strain on counter-terrorism cooperation
Increased geopolitical competition in South Asia

Unchecked bilateral escalation risks transforming a border dispute into a regional security crisis. Preventive diplomacy is essential to avoid spillover effects.

7. Way Forward: Managing Conflict without Escalation

A sustainable resolution requires separating ideological alignments from state-to-state diplomacy. Structured border dialogue, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and third-party mediation could reduce tensions.

Afghanistan must address concerns regarding TTP safe havens, while Pakistan must balance counter-terror operations with respect for Afghan sovereignty. Regional powers can facilitate de-escalation through multilateral platforms.

Engagement without formal recognition — as practised by some countries — may provide diplomatic space while maintaining normative positions.

Stable interstate relations depend on institutional mechanisms rather than informal alliances. Without structured engagement, cycles of retaliation risk entrenching hostility.

Conclusion

The Afghanistan–Pakistan crisis reflects the unintended consequences of proxy politics, unresolved historical disputes, and shifting regional alignments. The transformation of the Taliban from insurgents to rulers has altered strategic calculations in Islamabad.

For South Asia, the episode underscores the need for realistic foreign policy, border management, and multilateral conflict resolution. Long-term regional stability will depend not on tactical retaliation but on sustained diplomatic engagement and institutional trust-building.

Quick Q&A

Everything you need to know

The deterioration in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 stems from a shift in roles—from insurgent ally to sovereign government. When the Taliban were an insurgent group, Pakistan provided logistical and political support, expecting post-withdrawal influence in Kabul. However, once in power, the Taliban sought to assert strategic autonomy rather than function as a client regime, thereby challenging Pakistan’s expectation of ‘strategic depth’.

Three major fault lines have emerged. First, the Durand Line dispute resurfaced as a formal inter-state issue once the Taliban became the governing authority. Second, the rise of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban, intensified Pakistan’s internal security crisis. Third, the Taliban’s outreach to India has complicated Islamabad’s geopolitical calculus.

Thus, what was once a tactical alliance against a common adversary (the U.S.-backed Afghan government) has transformed into a complex relationship defined by sovereignty, border legitimacy, militancy, and regional power balancing.

The Durand Line, drawn in 1893 between British India and Afghanistan, divides Pashtun tribal areas and has historically been contested by successive Afghan governments. While the issue was muted during the Taliban insurgency phase, it became a formal inter-state dispute after 2021 when the Taliban assumed state authority.

Pakistan considers the Durand Line an internationally recognised boundary, while the Taliban have refused to formally endorse it. Border fencing by Pakistan and troop deployments have led to frequent skirmishes, including serious clashes in October 2025 and recent air strikes. The transformation of a historical grievance into active military confrontation underscores how territorial disputes gain renewed urgency when non-state actors become state actors.

The issue is significant because it involves questions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and ethnic identity. In a region already marked by militancy and fragile governance, unresolved boundary disputes can escalate rapidly into open conflict, as seen in the recent exchange of air strikes.

The resurgence of the TTP has fundamentally altered Pakistan’s internal security environment. Although organisationally distinct from the Afghan Taliban, the TTP shares ideological affinities and draws inspiration from the Taliban’s 2021 victory. Its objective is to establish a similar Islamist regime in Pakistan’s tribal belt.

Following the collapse of a Taliban-brokered ceasefire in 2022, violence surged. According to the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, around 400 people—mostly security personnel—were killed in TTP attacks last year. Pakistan accuses Kabul of harbouring TTP fighters, while the Taliban deny the charges. Islamabad’s cross-border strikes targeting alleged TTP camps have triggered retaliatory warnings from Kabul, escalating tensions.

This dynamic illustrates a classic case of blowback: support for one militant group (Afghan Taliban) has indirectly strengthened another hostile group (TTP). Pakistan now faces a dual challenge—managing cross-border militancy while avoiding full-scale interstate conflict.

Pakistan’s ‘strategic depth’ doctrine envisaged a friendly regime in Afghanistan to counter Indian influence and provide geopolitical leverage in the event of conflict. Supporting the Taliban was seen as a means to ensure a pliant government in Kabul. However, recent developments reveal the limitations of this approach.

Strengths of the doctrine (in theory):

Counterbalance India’s diplomatic presence in Afghanistan.
Ensure a secure western frontier.
Enhance regional bargaining power.

However, in practice, the Taliban have asserted independence, refused to recognise the Durand Line, and engaged diplomatically with India. Moreover, the rise of the TTP has undermined Pakistan’s internal security.

Thus, the doctrine appears to have backfired. Rather than securing depth, Pakistan faces instability on both its eastern and western borders. The episode highlights the risks of using non-state actors as instruments of foreign policy.

The evolving India–Taliban engagement has added a geopolitical dimension to Pakistan–Afghanistan tensions. Historically, India had strained ties with the Taliban during their first regime (1996–2001). However, post-2021, New Delhi has adopted a pragmatic engagement policy without formal recognition.

Recent examples include India hosting Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and the appointment of a Taliban envoy in Delhi. While India maintains this engagement is focused on humanitarian and developmental cooperation, Pakistan perceives it as strategic encirclement. Pakistan’s Defence Minister even labelled the Taliban a potential ‘proxy for India’.

For Pakistan, the warming India–Taliban ties undermine its traditional influence in Kabul. For India, calibrated engagement ensures regional connectivity and security monitoring. This triangular dynamic has heightened mistrust and contributed to the broader deterioration of Pakistan–Taliban relations.

Regional actors such as Iran, Russia, and China have called for dialogue and offered mediation. Their involvement reflects concerns about spillover instability, refugee flows, and extremist mobilisation. China, in particular, has strategic stakes in both countries due to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and security concerns in Xinjiang.

Successful mediation would require confidence-building measures such as:

Revival of border coordination mechanisms.
Joint action against TTP safe havens.
Formal dialogue on Durand Line management without immediate resolution.

However, deep mistrust and nationalist rhetoric—evident in the ‘open war’ narrative—pose obstacles.

The case underscores the complexity of post-conflict statecraft: insurgent movements transitioning to governance often recalibrate alliances. Sustainable peace will depend on institutionalised dialogue rather than tactical retaliation, making regional mediation both necessary and challenging.